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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT: THE GAP IN PROTECTION FROM
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
INTRODUCrION
The purposes and conditions of Tamms Correctional Center
("Tamms"), which is located in Tamms, Illinois, a town at the south-
ern-most tip of Illinois, can best be described by two stories. Both
stories-one from the perspective of the Department of Corrections,
the other from the perspective of the inmates-reveal the disturbing
nature of solitary confinement as implemented in super maximum se-
curity ("supermax") prisons' such as Tamms and those like it through-
out the United States. These stories were brought to light by a class
action lawsuit filed on January 6, 1999, by several Tamms inmates on
behalf of "all seriously mentally ill prisoners" at Tamms against the
prison warden, the prison psychologist, the Department of Correc-
tions' Director, and six other prison system employees. 2 The purpose
of the lawsuit is to challenge the conditions of "extreme social isola-
tion, restricted environmental stimulation, severely restricted move-
ment and harsh punishment for problematic behavior caused by their
illnesses .... -"3 The inmates seek monetary damages, an injunction,
and a ruling that, among other things, Tamms' procedures ignore pro-
tections against cruel and unusual punishment.4
This Comment examines the judiciary's refusal to extend Eighth
Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment to cases
alleging the inhumane psychological effects of confinement. Part I
presents the two stories of the Tamms facility, that of the inmates, and
that of the Department of Corrections.5 Part II reviews the purposes
1. Supermaximum security facilities are facilities fostering "extreme social isolation, reduced
environmental stimulus, scant recreational, vocational, or educational opportunity, and ex-
traordinary levels of surveillance and control. Prisoners are locked alone in their cells between
twenty-two and twenty-three-and-a-half hours a day. They eat and exercise alone." HUMAN
RIGHTs WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPERMAXIMUM SECURITY CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA 1
(1997).
2. See R.B. v. Washington, No. 99C 0056 at 2 (E.D. Ill. filed Jan. 7, 1999) [hereinafter Com-
plaint]. However, only four inmates are actually named as members of the class action on the
complaint. See id.
3. Complaint at 2.
4. Complaint at 86.
5. See infra notes 11-49 and accompanying text.
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of solitary confinement and documents the alarming psychological ef-
fects that may result from extended periods in solitary confinement. 6
This Part includes descriptions of solitary confinement in other U.S.
prison systems that have already been subjected to public scrutiny, but
failed to reach absolute constitutional violations in the eyes of the
courts. Part III outlines the history of the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment conditions-of-confinement cases and the Court's decision
in Farmer v. Brennan,7 which established the current standard for
Eighth Amendment challenges to conditions-of-confinement. 8 Part
IV presents cases that have applied the Farmer test, or a test similar,
to physical and psychological conditions-of-confinement cases. 9 Part
V discusses the possible approaches courts could take to fill the gap of
Eighth Amendment protection between the physical and psychologi-
cal conditions-of-confinement. 10
I. BACKGROUND ON TAMMS CORRECTIONAL CENTER
Both the inmates' and the Department of Corrections' stories de-
scribe the physical interior in a similar manner: a seventy square foot
cell, with heat and ventilation, containing a toilet, a sink, a desk, a bed,
storage for personal items, and an outside window." However, the
stories significantly diverge with respect to the purposes of the facility
and the privileges granted to the inmates.
A. The Department of Corrections
The Department of Corrections ("the Department") narrator paints
a picture of innovative prison reform designed "to protect the public
through incarceration, supervision, programs and services. ' 12 At this
facility, the Department will improve the safety at Illinois correctional
facilities by implementing a progressive system that offers more meas-
ures to modify the behavior of inmates.1 3 Tamms was built to "house
6. See infra notes 50-149 and accompanying text.
7. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
8. See infra notes 150-256 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 257-357 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 358-452 and accompanying text.
11. Complaint at 34; Tamms Closed Maximum Security Facility: Inmate Orientation Manual
17, 19 (Apr. 22, 1998) (on file with Tamms Closed Maximum Security Facility) [hereinafter
Tamms Orientation Manual]; Memorandum from Jean Maclean Snyder, Tamms Facts-Confiden-
tial 2-3 (Sept. 30, 1998) (on file with the University of Chicago's MacArthur Justice Center)
[hereinafter Tamms Memorandum]; Memorandum Compiling Inmate Letters from the MacAr-
thur Justice Center and the Institute for Community Law to the Coalition of Lawyers and Mem-
bers of Public Interest Community Concerned About Tamms Correctional Center 3-5 (July 13,
1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Inmate Letters].
12. Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 2.
13. See id.
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only those committed persons who are classified as maximum security
and who are in disciplinary segregation 14 or administrative deten-
tion."'1 5 During initial classification, a committee reviews the reason
for an inmate's placement at Tamms and classifies the inmate in one
of these two statuses.16 Generally, inmates not on restricted move-
ment are allowed to travel from their cell to the yard and shower
unescorted and unrestrained. 17 However, those on restricted move-
ment are handcuffed and escorted by two security staff members and
must submit to a visual search.' 8
The Tamms facility intends to "provide growth promoting opportu-
nities as alternatives to unlawful behavior [and] ... an array of serv-
ices for human care and optional programs for activity and self-
enhancement.' 19 However, many conditions and privileges are af-
forded to administrative detention inmates and are not applicable to
disciplinary segregation inmates. 20 Inmates in administrative deten-
tion who exhibit improved behavior have the opportunity to increase
the activities available to them through the Behavioral Level System,
which reviews inmates' behavior every ninety days.2' Some of the ac-
tivities include limited educational services, such as an ABE or GED
curriculum, as well as post-secondary correspondence courses.2
2
14. Disciplinary segregation results from a disciplinary hearing. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20,
§ 504.610 (1998).
15. Id. at § 505.30. According to prison officials, Tamms is for high-level gang leaders and
violent prisoners. See Tamms Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1. Warden George Welborn com-
mented that Tamms "was built for the worst of the worst." Christi Parsons, Locked out from
Life, CHI. TRm., Mar. 25, 1998, at 1. See Jonathan Eig, Deep Hole, CHICAGO, July 1998, at 61,
64. Welbom appears to model his prison's purpose after California's Pelican Bay State Prison
discussed herein. See infra notes 117-123 and accompanying text. Admittance into these pris-
ons, however, is not based on the severity of the original crime, but instead on violations com-
mitted by the inmates once in prison. See Scott N. Tachiki, Indeterminate Sentences in Supermax
Prisons Based upon Alleged Gang Affiliations: A Reexamination of Procedural Protection and a
Proposal for Greater Procedural Requirements, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1995) (discussing the
assignment of prisoners based on disciplinary violations). Administrative detention "is a nondis-
ciplinary status of confinement which removes a committed person from general population or
restricts the individual's access to general population." ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.660(1)
(1998).
16. See Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 2.
17. See id. at 5.
18. See id. The Orientation Manual does not clearly define how one is placed on restricted
movement or the relationship between administrative detention/disciplinary segregation and re-
stricted movement.
19. Id. at 2. "Counseling services and programs are provided to benefit the inmate in success-
ful community reintegration." Id. at 3. Education programs are available to eligible administra-
tive detention inmates and all inmates have access to religious materials and counseling. See id.
at 6-7.
20. See id. at 5.
21. See id.
22. See Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 6.
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Activities and programs available to all inmates include clinical
services, counseling, a law library, health care, religious services, and
volunteer services. 23 Each law library is equipped with numerous ref-
erence manuals and useful legal information and each inmate working
in the library is provided with the appropriate writing materials.24
Counselors are assigned to all inmates and make rounds to the cell
units once a week.2 5 All inmates also have the right to access ade-
quate health care including a medical staff, dentists, mental health
professionals, and psychiatric services.2 6 A psychiatrist, psychologist,
and social workers are on staff at Tamms, and community and institu-
tional resources are available for victims of sexual assault and aggres-
sors as well.27
B. The Inmates
The second narration, based on letters written by the inmates col-
lectively, tell a different story. Tamms prison is designed to break the
spirit of the inmates and to punish inmates who try to assert the few
rights owed them.28 The Department of Corrections rarely informs
inmates of the purpose for their transfer to Tamms.29 The inmates
complain that, since the opening of Tamms, there has been an arbi-
trary movement of particular inmates to justify Tamms' existence. For
example, inmates with disciplinary records from more than ten years
ago have been placed at Tamms presumably to begin filling the open
cells at the seventy-three million-dollar project.30
23. See id. at 3.
24. See id. at 4-5.
25. See id. at 7.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See generally Parsons, supra note 15, at 1 (criticizing the methodology of such facilities).
29. See, e.g., Inmates Letters, supra note 11 (revealing the frustration of the inmates regarding
their lack of understanding for their transfer to Tamms). Tamms has been termed a supermax
prison designed to hold over 500 of the state's toughest and most violent inmates. Hard Times
Getting Harder, ST. J. REG., Feb. 4, 1998, at 1. However, many inmates have commented on
their lack of disciplinary problems in the pre-transfer institutions. See Inmate Letters, supra
note 11, at 19-22. "They have us under the same rule as a segregation inmate-yet they call us
A-D inmates .... They are supposed to tell you why you are at Tamms." Id. at 9. For example,
inmate DJ commented that the committee reviews disciplinary incidents that occurred up to 15
years ago. Id. at 20. Inmate WL wrote, "I came here April 1, 1998 and it's now June 7, 1998 and
I still haven't been given a conclusory answer as to why I was sent here .... In Menard, I had
filed grievances ...." Id.
30. "There is a natural tendency, once super-maximum security facilities are built, to fill them;
standards for selecting prisoners for whom harsh conditions are warranted get diluted in prac-
tice." HUMAN RIGrrs WATCH, supra note 1, at 11 (assessing conditions at a supermax facility in
Indiana). See Inmate Letters, supra note 11. Ironically, the state spent tremendous amounts of
money on the facility, but inmates have repeatedly complained about malfunctioning equipment.
Id. For instance, as one inmate, SW, describes, "[t]his place isn't doing anything but going down
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The facility punishes inmates by withholding many of the privileges
they had at pre-transfer facilities. 31 Personal visits are limited to a
two-hour period once a month,32 showers are limited to once per
week for disciplinary segregation and twice per week for administra-
tive detention, 33 and inmates are guaranteed only a minimum of one
hour per week of exercise in the yard. 34 The 10'x20' concrete box
hardly serves its purpose as an exercise yard. High walls and a par-
tially covered concrete and mesh ceiling provide the only view to the
outside. 35
Aside from depriving the inmates of certain privileges, the prison
officials engage in mental and physical torture tactics that serve to in-
hill.... The intercom systems broke down two weeks ago and still haven't been repaired and we
have to yell, kick our doors to get the cops attention and are still ignored." Id. at 2. Another
inmate, LB, suggests, "[tihey are experimenting with us. This place wasn't ready to be open....
It's the new people who's never even worked in corrections whom they are giving the jobs to
down here!" Id. Inmate WL writes, "[s]eventy million for a place that's malfunctioning al-
ready-our cell doors are giving false-positive readings on the electronic panels .. " Id.
31. Privileges enjoyed by inmates at pre-transfer facilities that have been stripped at Tamms
include personal telephone calls, numerous personal visits, a larger commissary, allowance of
personal property including televisions and radios, and smoking privileges. See Tamms Orienta-
tion Manual, supra note 11; Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 10-14. Inmate DJ writes, "I've got
10 years worth of property.... I've got to get rid of all of it. They want you leaving Tamms with
nothing." Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 11. Inmate LB writes, "they are not allowing us our
hygiene products or anything else." Id. Inmate GS comments, "they give us state-issued cloth-
ing, and gym shoes, of such cheap material that after about 30 to 60 days they are falling off us
because they can't stand up to being washed." Id. Inmate GA notes that the prison does not
allow smoking because the FDA says nicotine is a drug; therefore, smokers are forced to quit
cold turkey without treatment patches or gum, which in itself is against the law. Id. at 12. The
law is clear on treating people addicted to drugs, and every smoker is addicted to nicotine. Id.
32. Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 13-14, 20. But see id. at 23 (providing ad-
ministrative detention inmates, at behavioral level two, two visits per month and, at behavioral
level three, four visits per month). Visitors are uncommon at Tamms because of the remote
location, over 400 miles from Chicago, in southern Illinois. See Eig, supra note 15, at 62; Patrick
E. Gauen, At 'Supermax' Prison, Isolation Is The Rule With No Exceptions, ST. LoUis PoST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 27, 1998, at C1. If visitors are more than 30 minutes late past their scheduled
appointment visit, their visit will be canceled for that day without consideration for the delay.
See Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 13. When visitors enter the facility grounds,
they are treated like caged animals and are often harassed in the parking lot. See Inmate Let-
ters, supra note 11, at 13-14.
33. See Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 17, 20. However, inmates in administra-
tive detention may receive increased shower privileges if they reach higher behavior levels. Id.
at 23.
34. See id. at 7. But see Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 12-13 (providing different amounts
of hours for inmates classified at different levels). However, the exercise privilege may be re-
stricted for weather or other conditions. See Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 4.
For example, Inmate SW writes, "the yards have no air on them and we have to end our yard if
we want a drink of water." Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 2.
35. See Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 12.
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timidate the inmates. 36 Prison officials may respond to what they per-
ceive as disruptive behavior with punishment, such as the cell
extraction procedures.37 Several of the inmates are reluctant to speak
out for fear of guard retribution. 38 Another psychologically torturous
condition includes the deprivation of human contact. Tamms creates a
sensory-deprived atmosphere by prohibiting human contact between
the inmates and other humans, except in instances when prison guards
shackle and handcuff the inmates for movement outside of the cell. 39
Inmates must also undergo strip searches every time they exit the pod,
including twice for law library visits and at least once for non-contact
personal visits. 40
Aside from the abuses, the system in place does not work. Many of
the conditions that are designed to decrease violence in the prison
system defeat the purpose of protecting the safety of staff, inmates,
and the public. Tamms does not provide meaningful alternatives to
"unlawful behavior" as suggested in the Orientation Manual rules and
regulations. 41 For example, the Department provides only inmates in
particular levels of administrative detention with educational material
and religious services on video but does not permit the inmates to
take the ABE and GED tests.42 Furthermore, "law library services
are inadequate at Tamms .... [I]t takes a week or two before a pris-
oner can get assigned to the law library area and it takes about two
36. "The security staff here gets huge canisters of gas and other chemical agents that are made
specifically for large crowds and outdoors, but they chose to use it indoors quite frequently here
in Tamms." Id. at 5. "There've been two instances in which I'm aware that a large German
Shepherd was brought onto the wings for which I was told was supposed to serve as an 'intimida-
tion factor."' Id. at 8.
37. Complaint at 31. A cell extraction is "a procedure in which members of a tactical team,
armed with batons and protected with plastic shields, spray burning chemical substances in the
inmate's face and then forcibly 'extract' him from his cell." Id.
38. See Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 1.
39. See Parsons, supra note 15, at 1; Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 6-7 ("1 will no longer be
able to hug my mother, my sister or my son .... One of the biggest, most simplest thing I took
for granted was human contact."). See also Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 5
(describing the process for restricted movement outside of the inmate's cell).
40. See Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 5, 13-14; Inmate Letters, supra note 11,
at 6-7, 13-14. Many of these strip searches seem to be conducted solely as a method to discour-
age inmates from using the only available resources that may keep them sane. Inmate Letters,
supra note 11, at 6-7, 13-14. "This includes having to lift one's genitals and spread the buttocks.
As there's never any contact with other prisoners the strip search policy can only be viewed as an
attempt to degrade or humiliate the prisoner." Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 6-7.
41. See Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 6-7.
42. These services are provided for administrative detention inmates at Levels two and three,
but not for inmates at Level one or for disciplinary segregation inmates. See Tamms Orientation
Manual, supra note 11, at 6, 18, 23-24; Interview with Jean MacLean Snyder, University of Chi-
cago Professor of Law (1998). All books, newspapers, and magazines requested by inmates must
be mailed by the publisher. See Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 13.
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weeks for the law librarian to respond to prisoners' requests for cases
and forms. '43 The facility does not give the inmates an opportunity to
"increase the activities available to them" through the Behavioral
Level System.44 Instead, inmates develop psychiatric symptoms and
aggressive behavior due to the monotony and the hopelessness of a
sensory deprived life.45
As a result of the monotony and hopelessness, some prisoners have
smeared feces all over themselves, others have engaged in self-mutila-
tion46 or have attempted suicide, while one inmate "removed a screw
from his light switch cover and inserted it into his penis just to get out
43. Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 9. Inmates remark that:
There are no Northeastern Reporters, no Federal Reporters, no Federal Supplements,
no Supreme Court Reporters, no Shepherds, no form books, no descriptive word in-
dexes for the Illinois Digest, no descriptive word indexes for the Federal Practice Di-
gest, no Illinois Digest Vol. 28, no Federal Practice Digest Vol. 60, no table of cases for
the Illinois and Federal Practice digests, no Illinois Digest on Prisoners, no books have
pocket parts .... [t]hey don't have any of the up-to-date laws and cases in the pocket
parts of the books. So we're forced to use what the laws were in 1996 with our suits,
which gives the attorney general an unfair advantage, and could end up costing some-
one their case in the future.
Id. at 9-10. This leaves one to wonder what does the library have?
44. See Tamms Orientation Manual, supra note 11, at 5. Keeping a clean cell is one condition
that may allow an inmate to earn increased activities. However, the facility does not provide
sufficient means for inmates to do so. See Eig, supra note 15, at 88-89. Inmate DJ observes,
"[t]he guards, once a week, carry a bucket of sponges from cell to cell. That's supposed to serve
as your broom, mop and toilet cleaner. The result is a lot of people living in dirty cells." Inmate
Letters, supra note 11, at 4.
45. See Complaint at 29-30. Inmate BC descriptively portrays how the conditions at Tamms
lead to psychological regression:
The community must understand the physical, emotional and psychological effects this
type of incarceration has on prisoners. Physically prisoners' health is at risk. They are
fed a low quality food; they are given in some cases two hours per week worth of
exercise on a yard that they could barely breathe in fresh oxygen; they receive air and
heat in their cells that is designed to cause discomfort in the winter and summer; and
the medical treatment is reactionary. Emotionally prisoners are vacillating between the
feelings of love and hate. They are made to feel that no one cares about them and their
problems; to help facilitate these feelings, they are denied phone calls to their family,
friends and community organizations; they are given visits once a month; their privates
are visually violated on a regular basis; they are bound in chains whenever they leave
their cages; and their grievances are all ways denied. Psychologically they are deterio-
rating. There is no value placed on their minds; there are no education programs; there
is no connection between prisoners and the outside world via t.v., radio and up-to-date
newspapers and magazines; prisoners spend hours in their cages fantasizing and day
dreaming; sometimes they display drowsiness, inability to sit still, bizarre and aggres-
sive behavior and sensitiveness to listening to other prisoners. Stated briefly, the com-
munity that these prisoners belong to will ultimately pay the price for this mistreatment
of human minds. This is why our family, friends and community organizations must act.
Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 15-16.
46. Complaint at 30. Mutilation is "the depriving a man of the use of any of those limbs
which may be useful to him in fight .... " BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1039 (7th ed. 1999).
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of his cell. ",47 Common reactions to the conditions-of-confinement are
anger and concern for release back into the general prison population
and back into society.48 Some inmates feel that their stay at Tamms
will make them more harmful to other institutions and society than
they were before coming to Tamms.49
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
The use of solitary confinement in the United States can be traced
back to the early Nineteenth Century prison reform movement in
Pennsylvania led by the Quakers.50 The Quakers believed that in iso-
lation, prisoners would reflect on their bad ways, repent, and then re-
form.51 Solitary confinement had also been implemented in Great
Britain beginning in the eighteenth century as a humane substitute for
the death penalty.5 2 Both societies viewed solitary confinement as a
deterrent and a rehabilitative form of punishment.5 3 As the century
progressed, state legislatures and the common law recognized and ad-
dressed the painful psychological effects of solitary confinement.
5 4
Shortly thereafter, the philosophy behind the use of solitary confine-
ment as a means of rehabilitation vanished as a new justification
47. Inmate Letters, supra note 11, at 15.
48. See id. at 15-17. The inmates are not alone in their concern. Psychologists have expressed
similar concerns after examining prisoners in solitary confinement. See Dr. Stuart Grassian, Psy-
chiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement 2, 16 (date unknown) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Grassian, Psychiatric Effects] ("[Effects of solitary
confinement] often prevents the inmate from successfully readjusting to the broader social envi-
ronment of general population in prison and, perhaps more significantly, severely impairs the
inmate's capacity to reintegrate into the broader community upon release from imprisonment.");
Craig Haney, Infamous Punishment: The Psychological Consequences of Isolation, NAT'L
PRISON PROJ. J. 3, 6-7 (Spring 1993) [hereinafter Haney, Infamous Punishment]; Tachiki, supra
note 15, at 1128 n.94.
49. Complaint at 2. Leslie V. White, Inside the Alcatraz of the 90's, CAL. LAW, Apr. 1992, at
96. See supra note 48 (discussing the possibility that supermax facilities increase prisoner vio-
lence and release more dangerous inmates into society).
50. See Sally Mann Romano, If the SHU Fits: Cruel and Unusual Punishment at California's
Pelican Bay State Prison, 45 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1093 (1996) (citing BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERI-
CAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 3 (1977)).
51. See id.
52. See Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analy-
sis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 477, 481-82
(1997).
53. Id.
54. See People v. Hahn, 83 N.E. 937, 938 (I11. 1908) (allowing prisoners in solitary confinement
to engage in forms of hard labor); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 55 N.E. 988, 989 (Mass. 1900)
(recognizing a statutory limit of 30 days as the maximum amount of time a prisoner may spend in
solitary confinement); State v. Peters, 4 N.E. 81, 87 (Ohio 1885) (permitting the transfer of men-
tally disturbed inmates from solitary confinement to an asylum); State v. Palmieri, 46 N.E.2d
318, 321 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938) (excluding solitary confinement from the terms of its prison
sentences).
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emerged.55 Then, as violence in prisons increased in the late twentieth
century, the purposes of solitary confinement evolved into a purely
disciplinary form of punishment. 56 Prison officials view solitary con-
finement as an effective safety measure that segregates and isolates
troublesome prisoners. 57
Even with the emergence of psychological reports suggesting the
harmful effects of solitary confinement, prison officials and the courts
continue to support its use to manage prison problems.5 8 Some pro-
ponents of solitary confinement justify its use by referring to psycho-
logical studies suggesting that previous studies overemphasized the
damaging effects of solitary confinement. 59 Others base their justifica-
tions on particular studies that find positive effects of solitary confine-
ment.6° One such study indicated that solitary confinement was not
more stressful than normal prison life.61 Furthermore, the study ob-
served an increase in the inmates' perceptual abilities. 62 Another
study found that isolated prisoners described solitary confinement as a
more pleasant experience than living in the non-isolated control popu-
lation.63 Many of these scientists, however, conducted these studies in
the early 1980s, prior to the emergence of studies characterizing the
devastating effects of solitary confinement in American prisons.64
55. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 491-94.
56. See Maria Luise, Solitary Confinement: Legal and Psychological Considerations, 15 NEw
ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 317-22 (1989) (discussing the psychological conse-
quences of isolation and its role in Eighth Amendment analysis).
57. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 491.
58. See id. at 491-93.
59. See L.H. Bukstel & P.R. Kilman, Psychological Effects of Imprisonment on Confined Indi-
viduals, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 469, 470-72 (1980) (concluding that seven separate studies reported
no major adverse responses to solitary confinement); D.H. Foster, Political Detention in South
Africa: A Sociopsychological Perspective, 18 INrr'L. J. MENTAL HEALTH 21, 24 (1989) (dismissing
an analogy between sensory deprivation and political detention as a result of inconsistencies in
sensory deprivation studies); Peter Suedfeld et al., Reactions and Attributes of Prisoners in Soli-
tary Confinement, 9 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 303 (1982) (reporting no major adverse effects to
solitary confinement); Richard H. Walters et al., Effect of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners, 19
AM. J. PSYCH. 771, 772 (1963) (suggesting that social isolation "does not result in mental deterio-
ration or in increased susceptibility to social influence").
60. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
61. See C.E.J. Ecclestone et al., Solitary Confinement of Prisoners: An Assessment of Its Ef-
fects on Inmates' Personal Constructs and Adrenocortical Activity, 6 CANADIAN J. BEHAV. SCI.
178, 188-89 (1974).
62. See id. at 187.
63. See Walters et al., supra note 59, at 772. The author of the study conceded that the study,
which was conducted for only four days and with volunteers as subjects, was not conclusive but
only suggestive. Id.
64. See supra notes 59-61.
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Since the days of personal observations by Charles Darwin65 to the
current clinical research performed by psychologists such as Dr. Stuart
Grassian 66 and Dr. Craig Haney, 67 researchers and observers have
seen the horrible injustices of solitary confinement. 68 American psy-
chologists, however, did not begin to document the effects of solitary
confinement as implemented in prison systems until the 1980s. 69
Characteristic symptoms displayed by prisoners in solitary confine-
ment include hallucinations, paranoia, and confusional psychosis; 70
however, these symptoms are just the observable and known short-
term symptoms.71 Clinical research is beginning to further delve into
the more disturbing long-term effects of solitary confinement. 72 This
Part of the Comment addresses challenges to solitary confinement
from scientists, while Parts III and IV examine challenges from the
legal profession.
A. Concern for the Effects of Solitary Confinement in the
Early Years
Prior to experiments performed by Stuart Grassian in the 1980s, the
United States did not have a collection of clinical research on the im-
pact of solitary confinement. 73 However, beginning in the early 1830s,
sources, such as Charles Darwin and Alexis de Tocqueville, provided
information regarding the damaging effects of solitary confinement. 74
Charles Darwin described inmates he saw in solitary confinement as:
dead to everything but torturing anxieties and horrible despair....
The first man.., answered.., with a strange kind of pause... [he]
fell into a strange stare as if he had forgotten something .... [Of
65. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
66. Dr. Stuart Grassian has conducted several studies in American prisons and has testified in
numerous state and federal courts regarding conditions-of-confinement. See infra notes 96-116
and accompanying text.
67. Dr. Craig Haney has conducted studies similar to Grassian and has written several articles
on the psychological implications of solitary confinement. See infra notes 117-136 and accompa-
nying text.
68. See Stuart Grassian, M.D., Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1983) [hereinafter Grassian, Psychopathological Effects]; Haney, Infamous
Punishment, supra note 48.
69. See Foster, supra note 59, at 23.
70. See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
72. See Grassian, Psychiatric Effects, supra note 48, at 2, 16 (analogizing the long-term effects
suffered by POW's to those suffered in solitary confinement); see also Shaun R. Whittaker,
Counseling Torture Victims, 16 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 272, 273-74 (1988) (likening solitary
confinement to torture and addressing the long-term effects of such torture).
73. See Grassian, Psychopathological Effects, supra note 68, at 1450.
74. See id. at 1450-51.
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another] Why does he stare at his hands and pick the flesh open....
and raise his eyes for an instant to those bare walls.75
In 1833, in a social commentary, Alexis de Tocqueville expressed con-
cern with the long-term effects of solitary confinement on the inmates,
as well as on society, when those inmates are released into the general
population. 76 Then, in 1890, the Supreme Court in In re Medley77
agreed with Darwin and de Tocqueville when describing similar ill ef-
fects of solitary confinement. 78 As medical literature arose to support
the occurrence of these effects,79 courts retracted from their con-
cerned view.80
During this same period, German concern over a large incidence of
prisoner psychotic disturbances spurred thirty-seven journal articles
characterizing symptoms characteristically seen in prisoners.8' The
German literature described a "hallucinatory, paranoid, confusional
psychosis" with symptoms typically including: (1) vivid visual, audi-
tory, tactile, and olfactory hallucinations; (2) dissociative episodes fol-
lowed by amnesia of that episode; (3) agitation and self-mutilation;
and (4) delusions of guard persecution.82 Even amidst these negative
responses, the United States remained steadfast to the Quaker philos-
ophy that solitary confinement worked to force prisoners to consider
the evil of their bad acts, to repent, and then to reform themselves.8 3
B. The Middle Years
As German studies and documented observations revealed the dis-
turbing consequences of solitary confinement, psychologists in the
United States began to research the effects of sensory deprivation in
general. A study performed in the 1950s placed subjects in conditions
that drastically reduced contact with external stimuli.84 Characteristic
75. Id. at 1450.
76. See Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 7.
77. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
78. Id. at 168 (describing the conditions of Walnut Street Penitentiary in Philadelphia in 1787).
See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 96-116, 117-149 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 319-334 and accompanying text.
81. See Grassian, Psychopathological Effects, supra note 68, at 1450-51. Not all of the journal
authors specified which group of prisoners was observed, but in over half of the articles the
authors identified solitary confinement as the group researched. Id.
82. Id. (citing PAUL H. NITSCHE & KARL WILLIAMS, THE HISTORY OF THE PRISON
PSYCHOSES (1913)).
83. See Romano, supra note 50, at 1093-94.
84. See Stuart Grassian & Nancy Friedman, Effects of Sensory Deprivation in Psychiatric Se-
clusion and Solitary Confinement, 8 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 49, 51 (1986) (citing CHARLES A.
BROWNFIELD, ISOLATION: CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES (1965); SENSORY DEPRI-
VATION, A SYMPOSIUM HELD AT HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL (PHILIP SOLOMON ET AL. EDS,
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
symptoms developed including perceptual distortions and sensory illu-
sions, vivid fantasies accompanied by hallucinations,8 5 derealization8 6
experiences, and hyper-reactivity to external stimuli.87 Subjects that
did not tolerate these symptoms well further displayed "cognitive im-
pairment ... massive free-floating anxiety, extreme motor restless-
ness, emergence of primitive aggressive fantasies, often accompanied
by fearful hallucinations. ' '88 The more extreme cases included a
"catatonic-like stupor with mutism. '' 89 Seclusion appeared to work
counterproductively with the patients.90
C. The Current Status
The strongest evidence of the detrimental effects of solitary confine-
ment emerge from studies performed in preparation for lawsuits chal-
lenging conditions of solitary confinement as violations of the Eighth
Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Dr.
Stuart Grassian conducted studies in response to prison conditions at
various institutions including the Massachusetts Correctional Institute
at Walpole and the Pelican Bay State Prison in California, discussed in
Part IV of the Comment. 91 Dr. Craig Haney participated in studies
for litigation against the Pelican Bay State Prison and provided inte-
gral facts and observations made in preparation for the case of Ruiz v.
1961)). The subjects were placed in light-proof, sound-proof rooms with cardboard tubes sur-
rounding the arms and hands to reduce sensation. Id.
85. Hallucinations
represent a 'breakdown' of the functioning of the organism in an incomplete (i.e. wrong
or 'broken') state .... The sensory-deprived person hallucinates because this is fulfil-
ling an important function for him; it is the mind's attempt to simulate the necessary
sensory input data of which it is being deprived. Conceivably one of the main results of
hallucinogenic drugs is to effect or at least to hasten this condition of normal input-
deprivation.
Susan H. Houston, Inquiry Into the Structure of Mentation Processes, 21 PSYCHOL. REP. 649, 654,
656 (1967). Ironically, prison systems prohibit hallucinogenic drugs, but provide for similar ef-
fects by instituting sensory deprivation in solitary confinement conditions.
86. Derealization is "a feeling of altered reality that occurs often in schizophrenia and in some
drug reactions." WEBSTER'S NIN-ir NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 342 (1989).
87. See Grassian & Friedman, supra note 84, at 51 (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id. Mutism is "the condition of being mute." WEBSTER'S NITH NEW COLLEGIATE DiC-
TIONARY 783 (1989).
90. See Grassian & Friedman, supra note 84, at 50. "'Since such isolation tends to promote
fantasy, regression, and bodily illusions in normal subjects, it would seem to be contra-indicated
for psychotic patients. . . . Sensory deprivation experiments support the growing feeling in
modem psychiatry that seclusion is harmful to mental patients."' Id. (quoting S. Freedman & M.
Greenblatt, Studies in Human Isolation 11: Hallucinations and Other Cognitive Findings, 11 U.S.
ARMED FORCES MED. J. 1479, 1492 (1960)).
91. See infra notes 358-452 and accompanying text.
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Johnson,92 also discussed in Part IV.93 Dr. Grassian has written about
the psychological effects of solitary confinement, 94 whereas Dr. Haney
has written about the legal implications of the psychological effects of
confinement.95
1. Study Conducted at Walpole
Dr. Stuart Grassian conducted the first well-recognized American
study on the effects of solitary confinement on prisoners at the Massa-
chusetts Correctional Institute at Walpole.96 The solitary confinement
block in this maximum-security facility housed sixty cells approxi-
mately 1.8mx2.7m in size, with each cell limited to a toilet, sink, bed,
table, stool, and one sixty-watt light bulb providing artificial light.97
The cells with double doors had one inner barred door and one outer
solid steel door with a small Plexiglas window, the only window in the
cell.98 The prison officers prohibited personal belongings inside the
inmate's cell, including radios, television sets, and all reading materi-
als, except a Bible.99
Initially, numerous inmates described their experiences in solitary
confinement with indifference. 100 As the interviews progressed, how-
ever, Dr. Grassian found that the inmates' earlier statements reflected
a denial of the mind-altering conditions and gave way to troubling
descriptions of mental torture. 10 Dr. Grassian found "strikingly con-
sistent" symptoms among the inmates he interviewed at Walpole. 0 2
The symptoms included:
92. 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
93. See infra notes 337-341 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Grassian, Psychopathological Effects, supra note 68; Grassian & Friedman, supra
note 84; Grassian, Psychiatric Effects, supra note 48.
95. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 52; Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48.
96. See Grassian, Psychopathological Effects, supra note 68, at 1451. Grassian's observations
at Walpole resulted from a order mandating psychiatric evaluation of 15 inmate plaintiffs in a
class action suit against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections for alleged Eighth
Amendment violations relating to solitary confinement conditions. Id. Only 14 inmates were
interviewed becaue the 15th was no longer in his cellblock at the time of the interviews. Id. All
inmates were male, with a median age of 28 and a median time length in isolation of two months.
Id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. Some inmate statements included, "[s]olitary doesn't bother me" and "[s]ome of
the guys can't take it-not me." Id.
101. Id. at 1452. Some inmates initially concealed their experiences because they feared that
guards would discover the inmate's weakness and torment the inmate. Id. These accounts coin-
cide with one of the German observations, delusions of guard persecution. Id.
102. See Grassian, Psychopathological Effects, supra note 68, at 1452.
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
1) sensory disturbances: perceptual distortions and loss of percep-
tual constancy, 10 3 in some cases without hallucinations; 2) ideas of
reference and paranoid ideation short of overt delusions;1' 4 3)
emergence of primitive aggressive fantasies, which remained ego-
dystonic and with reality-testing preserved; 4) disturbances of mem-
ory and attention short of overt disorientation and confusional
state; and 5) derealization experiences without massive dissociative
regression. 05
Accounts of sensory exaggeration by eleven of the fourteen inmates
included extreme annoyances such as the sound of rushing water
through the pipes of the plumbing system, the smell of food, and the
presence of a bee in an inmate's cell.' °6 Furthermore, seven inmates
described perceptual experiences where the inmate believed that he
heard or saw something, but then questioned whether the instance ac-
tually occurred. 0 7
For example, one inmate recalled, "I seem to see movements-real
fast motions in front of me. Then seems like they're doing things be-
hind your back-can't quite see them. Did someone just hit me? I
dwell on it for hours.' 08 In eight instances, the anxiety resulting from
solitary confinement caused recurrent physical conditions including
rapid heartbeat, perspiration, shortness of breath, panic, trembling,
and fear of imminent death.'0 9 Statements made by inmates reflecting
difficulties with thinking include: "I went to a standstill psychologi-
cally once-lapse of memory. I didn't talk for 15 days. . . . I think
what I am saying is true-not sure;" "I can't concentrate, can't
read .... Memory is going;" and "[g]ot to try to concentrate. '" 110
Some of the more disturbing symptoms observed by Dr. Grassian
reflected six inmates' "fantasies of revenge, torture, and mutilation of
the prison guards.""' Similarly disturbing were five reported epi-
sodes of a lack of impulse control with random violence, including
cases of self-mutilation. 12 The symptoms can be linked to the condi-
tions of solitary confinement because during a period of relief all of
103. Constancy is "a steadfastness of mind under duress." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICrIONARY 281 (1989).
104. Delusions are "a persistent false psychotic belief regarding the self or persons or objects
outside the self." Id. at 337.
105. Grassian, Psychopathological Effects, supra note 68, at 1453-54.
106. See id. at 1452.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id. ("My heart pumps real fast. I feel like I don't get enough oxygen. Get frantic.").
110. Id. at 1453.
111. Grassian, Psychopathological Effects, supra note 68, at 1453 ("[Plicture throwing a guard
in lime-eats away at his skin, his flesh-torture him. Try to block it out, but I can't.").
112. See id.
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the prisoners reported a "very .. .rapid diminution" of the symp-
toms. 113 Furthermore, more than a majority of these inmates denied
ever experiencing such symptoms before the period of solitary
confinement. 114
These observations are notably consistent with the previously dis-
cussed German studies." 5 Dr. Grassian's report has more impact,
though, because he chose subjects irrespective of their psychiatric sta-
tus, whereas the majority of the German studies focused on subjects
predetermined to suffer from "gross psychotic symptoms."" 6
2. Study Conducted at Pelican Bay
Drs. Grassian and Haney observed inmates in Security Housing
Units ("SHU") at Pelican Bay State Prison in California. 1-17 The con-
ditions in the SHU resemble the Walpole cells, 118 but also include iso-
lating advance technology to further separate the inmates from
sensory contact." 9 Three locked doors separate the inmate from an
armed control booth officer, isolating the inmate from other prisoners
and from the natural light of the outdoors.120 Furthermore, the prison
does not permit inmates to take educational or vocational classes or to
work.' 2 ' SHU inmates are isolated for twenty-two and one-half hours
a day and shackled in handcuffs and chains when outside of their cells,
except when permitted to exercise. 22 However, many inmates forgo
the exercise privilege because security measures require a visual strip
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1452-53.
115. See id. at 1451-54.
116. Id. at 1453. Some of the German subjects were observed in hospitals or "insane depart-
ments" of prisons. Id.
117. See Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 6. The description and purpose of
Tamms closely resembles the conditions at, and purpose of, Pelican Bay. Id. ("Pelican Bay, a
prison that was designated as a place for the 'worst of the worst' even before the prisoners ever
arrived.").
118. See Romano, supra note 50, at 1101 ("Each concrete cell contains a concrete stool, con-
crete bed, concrete writing table, and a toilet and a sink made of heavy stainless steel.").
119. See Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 3. The advanced technology includes
video screens in a central control room that monitor inmates' every movement and electronic
cell doors that prevent human interaction between the prison guard and the inmate. Id.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id.
122. See Romano, supra note 50, at 1101-02. The inmates may exercise unshackled during the
90 minutes permitted outside their cell each day in a 28'x12' area. Id. at 1102-03. The exercise
space, enclosed by a 20' wall and a ceiling, is far cry from what the word "exercise space" con-
notes. See Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 3. In Madrid v. Gomez, United
States District Court Chief Judge Thelton Henderson described inmates in these exercise cells as
"hauntingly similar to that of caged felines pacing in a zoo." 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1229 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
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search of the naked inmate in front of the control booth officer and
any other person in the area outside of the control booth.123 There-
fore, to some, time spent outside of the cell is considered more de-
grading and torturous than remaining in the solitary confinement cells
at Pelican Bay.
The symptoms Dr. Haney observed represent the destructive im-
pact of solitary confinement. 124 Many of the inmates interviewed by
Dr. Haney displayed characteristics similar to those seen by Dr. Gras-
sian at Walpole. 125 Dr. Haney further suggested that many of the psy-
chological consequences are predictable, but determining at what
point in time these consequences may emerge is more difficult; as time
goes on, however, the damaging effects begin to manifest. 126 Dr. Ha-
ney noted that "many prisoners become entirely dependent upon the
structure and routines of the institution for the control of their behav-
ior."'1 27 As a result, prisoners lose the ability to either set limits for
themselves 128 or to initiate any kind of behavior. 129 Social isolation,
Dr. Haney recognized, can lead to social withdrawal. 130 Social with-
drawal alienates the prisoner from interaction and disorients them
when in the presence of others.' 31
As a result, "[s]ome prisoners act out as a way of getting a reaction
from their environment" even though they realize that this type of
conduct often invariably results in a cell extraction. 132 Other prison-
ers "create their own sense of reality, one seemingly 'crazy' but easier
123. See Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 4.
124. See id. "The destructive consequences can only be understood in terms of the profound
importance of social contact and social context in providing an interpretive framework for all
human experience.... Human identity formation occurs by virtue of social contact with others."
Id.
125. See id. at 6. Haney recorded interviews with prisoners who displayed signs of depression,
anxiety, paranoia, suicide, and self-mutilation. Id. One prisoner expressed concerns that guards
in his unit were putting poison in his food, while another claimed that he had been slicing on his
arms just to see the blood flow. Id. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
126. See Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 5. The inmates initially conceal many
of these psychological consequences because the nature of prison life requires inmates to conceal
weaknesses and to preserve "dignity and autonomy." Id. As a result, early signs of psychologi-
cal disease will not be apparent to the "untrained or casual observers." Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. Some do not know how to handle even small amounts of freedom because they
do not know how to act without the "totality of behavior restraints." Id.
129. See id. The prisoners had been prohibited from organizing their own lives for so long
that it was difficult to concentrate or organize their thoughts coherently when given periods of
freedom. Id.
130. See id. "They move from being starved for social contact to being frightened by it." Id.
131. Id.
132. Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 5. The cell extraction procedure used at
Pelican Bay is similar to that described at Tamms. Id. at n.6. Dr. Haney describes the proce-
dure:
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for them to tolerate. ' 133 The deprivations and controlled environ-
ment may also lead to frustration, anger, and rage. 34 In a sense, then,
the conditions-of-confinement, which are implemented to deter and
punish certain types of conduct, actually increase the likelihood that
those types of conduct and resulting punishment will continue. 135 Dr.
Haney noted that
the levels of deprivation are so profound, and the resulting frustra-
tion so immediate and overwhelming, that for some, this lesson is
unlikely ever to be learned. The pattern can only be broken
through drastic changes in the nature of the environment, changes
that produce more habitable and less painful conditions-of-
confinement. 136
These two cases exemplify the devastating effects of sensory de-
prived solitary confinement conditions. The earlier studies that sug-
gested solitary confinement does not produce harmful symptoms,
were conducted in environments that did not amount to the sensory
deprivation seen at Walpole, Pelican Bay, or Tamms. 137 For instance,
the Walter's study was conducted using self-selected inmates who vol-
unteered to spend four days in solitary confinement. 138 The length of
time spent in these conditions was minimal in comparison to the inde-
terminate time spent in studies conducted by Drs. Grassian and Ha-
ney.1 39 The voluntary nature of many of these studies hardly
compares to the involuntary and harsh conditions seen at Walpole,
Pelican Bay, and Tamms.140 Furthermore, earlier researchers failed to
consider the possibility of long-term effects that may not surface until
The first member of the [five-man cell extraction] team is to enter the cell carrying a
large shield, which is used to push the prisoner back into a comer of the cell; the second
member [wields] a special cell extraction baton, which is used to strike the inmate on
the upper part of his body so that he will raise his arms in self-protection;... the inmate
is pulled off balance by another ... whose job is to place leg irons around his ankles;
once downed, a fourth member of the team places him in handcuffs; the fifth member
stands ready to fire a taser gun or rifle that shoots wooden or rubber bullets at the
resistant inmate.
Id.
133. Id. at 5.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 6; Grassian, Psychopathological Effects, supra note 68, at 1451.
138. See Walters et al., supra note 59, at 771.
139. See Grassian & Friedman, supra note 84, at 53.
140. But see Foster, supra note 59, at 24 (stating that involuntary detention by police does not
match voluntary participation); Suedfeld et al., supra note 59, at 303 (finding no dramatic differ-
ences between convicts in solitary confinement involuntarily and convicts not in solitary
confinement).
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after the studies were conducted. 141 Therefore, instead of providing
contradictory evidence, these earlier reports emphasize the destruc-
tive impact of involuntary and indeterminate periods of sensory depri-
vation similar to that implemented in solitary confinement at
Tamms. 142
Lastly, a Danish study performed during a fifteen month period
from November 1991 to February 1993 at the Western Prison in Den-
mark supports Dr. Grassian and Dr. Haney's results. The study
sought to ascertain the effect of solitary confinement on the mental
health of inmates.143 The researchers compared the incidence of hos-
pitalization from solitary confinement to the hospitalization among
prisoners who had not been detained in solitary confinement. 144 The
conditions at Western Prison did not meet the same level of horror as
the American prisons, 45 but the prison did restrict the inmates from
previously granted rights. The inmates resided in total segregation
from other prisoners in 8m2 cells that contained a bed, table, televi-
sion, and radio. 46 The study concluded that
[t]he relative risk of admission to the prison hospital for psychiatric
morbidity 147 was higher and increased with time in [solitary con-
finement] compared to [not in solitary confinement] . . . indicating
that individuals detained in [solitary confinement] are forced into an
environment that increases their risk of hospitalization for psychiat-
ric reasons. 148
Therefore, the study revealed that the longer the period of time an
inmate remains in solitary confinement, the greater the risk that the
inmate will need to seek psychiatric hospitalization. 49
141. See Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 6.
142. But see Paul Gendreau & James Bonta, Solitary Confinement is Not Cruel and Unusual
Punishment: People Sometimes Are!, 26 CANADIAN J. CRIM. 467 (1984) (recognizing that inmates
considered solitary confinement cruel and unusual, not because of the sensory deprivation, but
because of the psychological reactions to administrative inadequacies).
143. See Dorte Maria Sestoft et al., Impact of Solitary Confinement on Hospitalization Among
Danish Prisoners in Custody, 21 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 99 (1998).
144. See id. at 99.
145. See supra notes 96-99, 117-123 and accompanying text.
146. See Sestoft et al., supra note 143, at 100. The prisoners were allowed visits of one hour
per week maximum and telephone calls and had free access to books and newspapers. Id. These
allowances, in themselves, provided the Danish inmates with substantially more personal rights
than the American prisons, which may severely restrict reading material, prohibit televisions and
radios, and harshly limit or prohibit visits and phone calls. See supra notes 31-35, 96-99, 118-123
and accompanying text.
147. Morbidity is "the relative incidence of disease." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 771 (1989).
148. Sestoft et al., supra note 143, at 105.
149. See id. After analyzing the results of the study, the authors called for an acceptable
standard of law that either abolishes solitary confinement or drastically changes the current Dan-
ish conditions which would eradicate the effects ascertained in the study. Id. at 105-06.
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III. THE HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT'S EIGHTH
AMENDMENT CASES
The Eighth Amendment serves as a substantive safeguard against
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in our prison sys-
tems. 150 Courts look to precedents and to "evolving standards of de-
cency" in their Eighth Amendment analysis.151 Throughout the
twentieth century, the Court has developed a test that adapts to
"evolving standards of decency" to analyze the constitutionality of dif-
ferent forms of punishment.152 The most recent Eighth Amendment
law is found in Farmer v. Brennan, 53 a 1994 Supreme Court case
which clarified the two-prong test used in Eighth Amendment cases.
A. Providing the Framework for an Eighth Amendment Test
In Medley,154 a prisoner sentenced to death for the murder of his
wife petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus to re-
lieve him from the imprisonment of solitary confinement while he
awaited his execution. 155 The prisoner argued that the 1889 Colorado
statute under which he was sentenced was ex post facto because it
repealed the previous applicable statute and went into effect after the
prisoner committed the crime. 56 The central issue in Medley did not
focus on the constitutionality of particular conditions of solitary con-
finement.' 57 The Court, however, did recognize some of the horrors
of solitary confinement as implemented by the Walnut-Street Peniten-
tiary in Philadelphia in 1787:
The peculiarities of this system were the complete isolation of the
prisoner from all human society, and his confinement in a cell of
considerable size, so arranged that he had no direct intercourse with
or sight of any human being, and no employment or instruction....
But experience demonstrated that there were serious objections to
it. A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short
confinement, into a semifatuous condition, from which it was next
to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane;
150. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
151. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
152. See infra notes 164-256 and accompanying text.
153. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
154. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
155. Id. at 161.
156. Id.
157. The central holding in Medley recognized that the imposition of a sentence in solitary
confinement is an additional punishment to imprisonment itself. Id. at 171. Therefore, an act
that further imposed conditions of solitary confinement as punishment is ex post facto as to
crimes committed before it went into effect. Id.
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others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal
better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not re-
cover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to
the community. It became evident some changes must be made in
the system .... 158
The Medley Court acknowledged that the Colorado statute instituted
solitary confinement in a manner similar to the Walnut-Street Peni-
tentiary.159 Although the Court did not question the constitutionality
of these conditions, it did recognize that solitary confinement was a
punishment additional to incarceration itself, and therefore imposed a
greater punishment than the repealed statute.160
The Supreme Court, in Weems v. United States,161 began to define
the contours of Eighth Amendment protection. In this case, the legis-
lature imposed a fine and at least twelve years of imprisonment of
hard and painful labor for the falsification of a public and official doc-
ument by a public figure.162 The Court invalidated the penalty be-
cause the punishment was disproportionate to the severity of the
offense, and therefore was cruel punishment. 163 In effect, the Court
expanded Eighth Amendment analysis to include both the method
and the length of execution.
In Trop v. Dulles,164 the Court addressed the constitutionality of the
non-physical forms of cruel and unusual punishment. The Court rec-
ognized that the power to punish must "be exercised within the limits
of civilized standards."'1 65 The Trop Court also recognized that the
scope of the Eighth Amendment is not static.166 In determining that
the use of denationalization as a punishment for desertion from the
United States Army constituted cruel and unusual punishment, 167 the
Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment "from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 68
The Court acknowledged the fact that denationalization is not a physi-
cal form of punishment. 169 Surprisingly, the Court found that dena-
158. Id. at 168. The psychological reactions observed by the Court appear strikingly similar to
the effects of sensory deprivation observed today in supermax prisons such as Tamms.
159. Id. at 168-69.
160. Medley, 134 U.S. at 171.
161. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
162. See id. at 358-59.
163. See id. at 381-82.
164. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
165. Id. at 100.
166. Id. at 99 ("The exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been
detailed by this Court.").
167. See id. at 101.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 101-02.
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tionalization is a "form of punishment more primitive than torture...
[for it] subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and
distress."'1 70 The Court continued by hypothesizing the individual's
possible fears and the consequences of denationalization and then re-
futed the argument that these consequences do not violate the Eighth
Amendment because they are not actual but only possible. 17'
The Court provided the foundation for the Farmer test in Estelle v.
Gamble.172 Estelle was the first Supreme Court case to apply the
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause to depriva-
tions not specifically part of a prisoner's sentence.' 73 In Estelle, the
plaintiff claimed that he received inadequate medical treatment from
prison personnel after sustaining an injury.174 The Court cited previ-
ous Supreme Court and circuit court cases to establish that the gov-
ernment has an obligation to provide medical care for those it
incarcerates. 75 Failure to do so "may actually produce physical 'tor-
ture or a lingering death,"1 76 which the Eighth Amendment originally
prohibited.177 The Court stated that "[t]he infliction of such unneces-
sary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency
as manifested in modern legislation .... "178 As a result, the Court
held that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prison-
ers constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' ... ,179
However, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, or
negligence on behalf of medical personnel, does not constitute a viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment. 180 The Court determined that the
plaintiff did not state a claim for medical indifference because medical
personnel saw him on seventeen occasions during a three-month
period.181
170. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101-02.
171. See id. at 102 ("The threat makes the punishment obnoxious.").
172. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
173. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) ("Estelle, we noted, first applied the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to deprivations that were not specifically part of the
prisoner's sentence.").
174. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98.
175. See id. at 103 ("These elementary principles establish the government's obligation to pro-
vide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.").
176. Id. (citation omitted).
177. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death .... ).
178. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04.
179. Id. at 104.
180. See id. at 105-06.
181. See id. at 107.
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In Hutto v. Finney,182 the Supreme Court established that condi-
tions-of-confinement may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.
In Hutto, the Court upheld the district court's determination that the
conditions of solitary confinement in the Arkansas penal system con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amend-
ment.183 The Court restated the district court finding that solitary
confinement "is not necessarily unconstitutional, but it may be de-
pending on the duration of the confinement and conditions
thereof.... A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of 'grue' might be
tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months."'1 84
In this case, the Court looked at the conditions of isolation as a whole,
the inmates' diet, the overcrowding, the violence, the vandalized cells,
and the lack of care on the part of the prison personnel to uphold the
finding that the isolation cells violated the Eighth Amendment. 185
Furthermore, in this case, some of the inmates had infectious diseases;
the Court held that the likely harm that these conditions pose violated
the Eighth Amendment, even though the possible infection might not
affect all that were exposed. 186
Then, in 1981, the Court in Rhodes v. Chapman 87 considered par-
ticular conditions-of-confinement that may constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment. 188 The plaintiff in Rhodes claimed that double
celling was an Eighth Amendment violation. 89 To determine whether
the overcrowding constituted a violation, the Court looked to contem-
porary values. The Court interpreted Estelle as having adopted "ob-
jective indicia" derived from history, state legislative action, and
sentencing by juries, in assessing "evolving standards of decency."' 90
Furthermore, the Court adopted a "totality of conditions" approach
announcing that "[c]onditions ... alone or in combination, may de-
prive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.' 9'
The Rhodes Court, however, noted that the Constitution does not
mandate comfortable prisons, and therefore, provided great deference
to the legislature and prison officials in allowing them to determine
182. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
183. See id. at 685. "Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment
subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards." Id.
184. Id. at 685-87 (citation omitted).
185. See id. at 687.
186. See id. at 682.
187. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
188. See id. at 345.
189. See id. at 339.
190. Id. at 346-47.
191. Id. at 347.
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and implement effective measures of prison reform. 192 The Court
noted that double ceiling was necessary because of an unanticipated
increase in prison population, and found that it did not "lead to depri-
vations of essential food, medical care," or sanitation, and it did not
increase violence among the inmates. 93 As a result, the Court found
that the remaining complaints of limited job and educational opportu-
nities did not inflict unnecessary or wanton pain and did not create
conditions grossly disproportionate to the proscribed punishment. 194
In Whitley v. Albers,195 the plaintiff claimed that prison officials sub-
jected him to cruel and unusual punishment by shooting him during
their attempt to overcome a prison riot.196 The Court recognized the
principle set forth in Estelle and Rhodes establishing that inadvertence
or error in good faith fails to rise to an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion.' 97 Rather, "[a]fter incarceration, only the 'unnecessary and wan-
ton infliction of pain' . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
. "... 9198 The Court applied a higher standard for wantonness which
included only actions committed "maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm."'199 The subjective standard applied in
Whitley is harder to prove than the deliberate indifference standard
articulated in Estelle or the lack of a subjective standard in Rhodes
because the standard for a prison official's use of force cannot be es-
tablished without "balancing competing institutional concerns for the
safety of prison staff or other inmates. ' 200 On the other hand, "the
192. See id. at 349.
[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the
requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best
to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system: to punish justly,
to deter future crime, and to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved
change of being useful, law-abiding citizens.
Id. at 352.
193. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. However, the Court determined that double ceiling was not per
se cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
194. See id. at 348-49.
195. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
196. See id. at 314.
197. See id. at 319 ("[I]nadvertance or error in good faith, that fails to characterize the con-
duct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in
connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring
official control over a tumultuous cellblock.").
198. Id. (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 320-21.
200. Id.
[In making and carrying out decisions involving the use of force to restore order in the
face of a prison disturbance, prison officials undoubtably must take into account the
very real threats the unrest presents to inmates and prison officials alike, in addition to
the possible harms to inmates against whom force might be used.
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State's responsibility to attend to the medical needs of prisoners does
not ordinarily clash with other equally important government respon-
sibilities," 201 and therefore, in that context, deliberate indifference
would constitute wantonness.
Factors indicating actions committed "maliciously and sadistically"
include the need for the use of force, the relationship between the
need for force and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury
inflicted, and any efforts made to diminish the severity of forceful ac-
tion.202 The Court determined that the prison officials' use of force
was necessary because "an officer's safety was in question and ... an
inmate was armed and dangerous. '20 3 Furthermore, the Court upheld
the decision because a warning shot was given and the order was to
shoot low, and therefore the action was not wanton.20 4 As a result,
the Court granted prison officials wide latitude in enforcing safety in
their institutions.
The Court in Wilson v. Seiter205 clarified the ambiguity regarding
the need for a subjective intent in conditions-of-confinement cases. In
Wilson, the plaintiff's complaint alleged generally poor prison condi-
tions including overcrowding, excessive noise, inadequate heating and
cooling, improper ventilation, unsanitary restrooms and dining facili-
ties, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates.206 The
Court instructed that pains inflicted outside of the punishment estab-
lished by statute or the sentencing judge constitute cruel and unusual
punishment only when some mental element can be attributed to the
inflicting officer.207 The Court held that, in cases challenging condi-
tions-of-confinement that are not formally imposed as a sentence, the
standard for wantonness is one of deliberate indifference, the same
standard applied in cases regarding inadequate medical treatment. 20 8
The Court also addressed the objective portion of the Eighth
Amendment test requiring a sufficiently serious deprivation. Similar
to the Rhodes requirement, the inmate must be denied the "minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities" to meet the objective compo-
201. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
202. See id. at 321.
203. Id. at 323 (citations omitted).
204. See id. at 325.
205. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
206. See id. at 296.
207. See id. at 300. Punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. See Duck-
worth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985).
208. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303.
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nent.20 9 However, Justice Scalia narrowly interpreted the Rhodes
Court's use of the "totality of conditions" approach:
Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amend-
ment violation "in combination" when each would not do so alone,
but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect ... for exam-
ple, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue
blankets.... Nothing so amorphous as "overall conditions" can rise
to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific depri-
vation of a single human need exists.... [The prisoner must show a
deprivation of] an identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or
exercise.210
In this decision, the Court basically rejected the "totality of condi-
tions" approach, thereby limiting the amount of plausible claims that
fall under Eighth Amendment protection.211
The Court in Helling v. McKinney212 summarized precedents to
support its decision to grant Eighth Amendment protection against
sufficiently imminent dangers.2 13 The plaintiff in Helling alleged that
compelled exposure to harmful chemicals in tobacco smoke in the
prison environment posed an unreasonable risk to his health, and
therefore violated the Eighth Amendment.214 The Court recognized
that "a remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event. '2 15
The Court cited two Court of Appeals decisions granting Eighth
Amendment relief to inmates under a threat to personal safety from
exposed electrical wiring, deficient firefighting measures, and the in-
termingling of inmates with serious contagious diseases and to inmates
threatened by inmate assaults.216 The Court noted that "the Eighth
Amendment protects against sufficiently imminent dangers as well as
current unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and suffering
.... 217 Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiff stated a cause of
action under the Eighth Amendment.218 However, the Court re-
quired the plaintiff, on remand, to provide "more than a scientific and
statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm and the
209. Id. at 304.
210. Id. at 304-05.
211. See Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Con-
ditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373, 391 (1995) (discussing the implications of the
Wilson Court's dismissal of the "totality" approach).
212. 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
213. See id. at 33-34.
214. See id. at 31.
215. Id. at 33.
216. See id. at 33-34 (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980); Gates v. Collier,
501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974)).
217. Helling, 509 U.S. at 34.
218. See id. at 35.
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likelihood that such injury to health will actually be caused by expo-
sure .... ,,219 The Court instructed the trial court "to assess whether
society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone
unwillingly to such a risk. ' 220 However, the Court did not instruct the
lower court on how to make this determination.
B. Farmer v. Brennan
1. Facts
Dee Farmer, a biologically male transsexual221 inmate was placed in
the federal prison system with male inmates.222 Farmer displayed
feminine characteristics, underwent estrogen therapy, received breast
implants, and unsuccessfully attempted testicle-removal surgery.22 3
Federal prisons place preoperative transsexuals22 4 in prison popula-
tions with those of similar biological sex. Farmer was segregated in at
least one penitentiary for her own safety and at several other peniten-
tiaries for disciplinary reasons. 225
On one occasion, the Federal Correctional Institute in Oxford, Wis-
consin, transferred Farmer to the United States Penitentiary in Terre
Haute, Indiana, for disciplinary reasons. 226 At the Terre Haute peni-
tentiary, Farmer was beaten and raped by a male inmate in her cell.
227
Prior to the rape, Farmer did not express concern for her safety to any
prison officials.228 However, Farmer reported the incident a week
later and, without counsel, filed a complaint alleging that the defend-
219. Id. at 36.
220. Id.
221. A transsexual is "one who has '[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels per-
sistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and who typically seeks medical treat-
ment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change." Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF MEDICINE 1006 (1989)).
222. See id.
223. See id. Farmer continued her hormonal treatment while in prison by taking smuggled
drugs and continued to dress in a feminine manner. Id.
224. Farmer was considered a preoperative transsexual because the testicle-removal surgery
was unsuccessful. Id. The basis of the method for separation ignores the fact that the transsex-
ual emotionally and psychologically feels and acts as a member of the opposite sex. Id. The only
male characteristic retained by Dee Farmer was hidden, particularly in relation to the many
female characteristics that were obvious. See id.
225. See id. at 830.
226. See id. In essence, the transfer removed Farmer from the less dangerous correctional
facility to a higher security penitentiary "that houses more troublesome prisoners." Id.
227. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830.
228. See id. at 832.
[Vol. 49:567
GAP IN PROTECTION
ant prison officials229 violated her Eighth Amendment right by their
"deliberately indifferent failure to protect petitioner's safety. '230
Farmer alleged that the prison officials
either transferred [Farmer] to USP-Terre Haute or placed [her] in
its general population despite knowledge that the penitentiary had a
violent environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite
knowledge that [Farmer], as a transsexual who "projects feminine
characteristics," would be particularly vulnerable to sexual assault
by some USP-Terre Haute inmates.231
Farmer sought compensatory and punitive damages. 232 She also re-
quested an injunction to remove her from Terre Haute and place her
in a correctional facility with a prohibition from transferring her to
any other penitentiary.233
The District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted
summary judgment to prison officials declaring that the prison offi-
cials did not have "actual knowledge" of a potential danger because
Farmer never expressed to the defendants a concern for her safety.234
Therefore, they had not been deliberately indifferent to Farmer's
safety. 235 The Seventh Circuit summarily affirmed 236 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari because the circuits had imple-
mented inconsistent objective and subjective tests for "deliberate
indifference. ,237
2. The Opinion
The Supreme Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment im-
poses a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions-of-con-
finement. 238 These conditions include ensuring that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and that prison of-
229. The defendants included the Warden of USP-Terre Haute and the Director of the Bu-
reau of Prisons, the Warden of the FCI-Oxford and a case manager there, and the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons North Central Region Office and an official in that office. Id. at 830.
230. Id. at 831.
231. Id. at 830-31.
232. See id. at 831.
233. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 831.
234. See id. at 831-32.
235. Id. at 831. The District Court stated that the Court would find a violation of the Eighth
Amendment only if prison officials were "reckless in a criminal sense," or as defined, possessed
"actual knowledge" of a potential danger. Id.
236. See id. at 832. No opinion was written.
237. Id. In McGill v. Duckworth, the Seventh Circuit standard required a "subjective stan-
dard of recklessness." 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991). However, in Young v. Quinlan, the
Third Circuit found that "a prison official is deliberately indifferent when he knows or should
have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate." 960 F.2d 351, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1992).
238. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
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ficials "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the in-
mates. '239 However, not every injury suffered by one inmate caused
by another translates into a constitutional violation.240 A constitu-
tional violation arises when the injury meets a two-prong test.241 First,
the injury alleged must be "sufficiently serious, '242 and second, the
prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind. '2 43
The requisite state of mind is one of "deliberate indifference" to the
inmate's health or safety.244 For a claim based on a failure to prevent
harm, the inmate must show that he is imprisoned under conditions
creating a substantial risk of serious harm.2 45 The Court in Farmer
adopted this two-prong test from Wilson v. Seiter but recognized that
the Court had not clearly defined "deliberate indifference. '246
In analyzing Farmer's claim, the Supreme Court explained the
meaning of "deliberate indifference. ' 247 The Court adopted and im-
posed a standard similar to the subjective recklessness standard of
criminal law.2 48 In order for Farmer, or any other federal inmate, to
assert an Eighth Amendment claim for denying an inmate humane
conditions-of-confinement, the inmate must show that the official was
aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health and
safety.249 A prison official will be held liable for denying humane con-
ditions-of-confinement under the Eighth Amendment only if the offi-
cial knows that an inmate faces an excessive risk and disregards that
239. Id. (citation omitted). In particular, the Court assumed that prison officials have a duty
to protect inmates from the violence of other inmates. Id. at 833. The Court realized that being
subject to violent assaults in prison is not "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society." Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Allowing
beatings or rape does not serve any legitimate penological purpose and does not conform to
"evolving standards of decency." Id. at 833 (citations omitted).
240. See id. at 834.
241. See id.
242. Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). "[The] prison official's act or omission
must result in the denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities."' Id. (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981)).
243. Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)).
244. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03).
245. See id. at 834.
246. Id. at 834-47.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 837-38.
249. See id. at 837. However, a prison official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that was
obvious but not perceived does not fall within this definition of "deliberate indifference." Id. at
838. Therefore, the Court's interpretation is a subjective standard as previously applied in Wil-
son and not the objective standard adopted by some of the federal circuits. See Young v. Quin-
lan, 960 F.2d 351, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1992); Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556,
560 (1st Cir. 1988); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057-58 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (all
applying an objective standard of deliberate indifference).
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risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.25° In defining
the standard, the Court distinguished "inhumane conditions" from
"cruel and unusual punishment." The Eighth Amendment protects
inmates from the latter and not the former.251 Prison conditions are
not considered a form of punishment until an inmate can establish
that the prison official intended the condition to be a form of punish-
ment.252 Therefore, a prison official who fails to notice and alleviate
an obvious and significant risk cannot be liable for infliction of "cruel
and unusual punishment. ' 253 When the Supreme Court applied this
standard to Farmer's case, the Court determined that the district court
may have placed too much weight on Farmer's failure to notify prison
officials of a risk of harm.254 The failure to give advance notice of
possible harm is not dispositive of deliberate indifference. 255 There-
fore, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court.256
The Supreme Court cases discussed in this Part of the Comment
addressed a range of inmate complaints including medical indiffer-
ence, failure-to-protect, excessive use of force, general conditions-of-
confinement, and imminent dangers. Part IV demonstrates how
courts have applied the Farmer standard to each of the inmate com-
plaints just listed.
IV. THE FARMER STANDARD APPLIED TO CONDITIONS OF
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
Conditions-of-confinement cases alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment proscription from "cruel and unusual punishment" ad-
dress prison official's medical indifference, failure-to-protect, and ex-
cessive use of force, as well as inhumane conditions-of-confinement,
including both physical conditions and psychological effects. How-
ever, most of the conditions-of-confinement cases address physical
conditions rather than the psychological effects.257 As a result, the
courts have set some basic standards for physical conditions of solitary
confinement, as well as for claims of medical indifference, failure-to-
protect, and excessive use of force. The courts require prison officials
to provide inmates with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
250. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
251. See id. at 837.
252. See id. at 839-40.
253. Id. at 838.
254. See id. at 849.
255. See id. at 849 n.10.
256. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 851.
257. See infra notes 263-357 and accompanying text.
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and a reasonably safe environment.2 58 These guidelines, however,
scarcely protect inmates in solitary confinement from the psychologi-
cally "inhumane conditions of confinement. 2 59 The following cases
address the standards for medical indifference, failure-to-protect, 260
and excessive use of force claims, then the standards for physical con-
ditions-of-confinement, 261 and lastly the standards, or lack thereof, for
psychological effects of conditions-of-confinement.2 62
A. Farmer Applied to Claims of Medical Indifference, Failure-to-
Protect, and Excessive Use of Force
1. The Objective Prong
The Supreme Court has set particular objective standards for levels
of adequate medical care and the safety of inmates. For instance,
courts require prison officials to provide inmates minimum levels of
medical care, but an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care, or negligence on behalf of medical personnel, does not constitute
a violation of the Eighth Amendment.263 In Whitley v. Albers, the
Court acknowledged that the Eighth Amendment prohibits "mali-
cious and sadistic infliction of pain" and punishments that are grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime.264 However, courts have
permitted prison officials' use of mace in situations where inmates
pose a threat to prison officials.265 Furthermore, courts are required
258. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). Safety concerns encompass protec-
tion from the violence of both other inmates and prison guards. Id.
259. See Bryan B. Walton, Eighth Amendment and Psychological Implications of Solitary Con-
finement, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 271 (1997) (assessing the difficulties in meeting Eighth
Amendment standards); see also Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 541 (discussing psychological
implications of solitary confinement, Eighth Amendment law, and possible ways to protect in-
mates from the harmful effects of solitary confinement).
260. Failure-to-protect claims are made in instances "where prison officials either fail to pro-
tect an inmate from a specific threat of violence or allow a stream of violence pervade the insti-
tution." Jeffrey M. Lipman, Eighth Amendment and Deliberate Indifference Standard for
Prisoners: Eighth Circuit Outlook, 31 CREiGrHTON L. REV. 435, 442-44 (1998).
261. Physical conditions-of-confinement include tangible components of imprisonment, such
as the size of the cell, the cleanliness of the cell, food, clothing, and exercise privileges.
262. Psychological effects result from the physical conditions-of-confinement as well as intan-
gible components that are not readily visible, including the amount of sensory stimulation, the
availability of meaningful activity, the amount and quality of permissible privileges, and treat-
ment from prison officials.
263. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-06 (1976).
264. 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
265. See Bailey v. Tbrner, 736 F.2d 963, 969-70 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the use of mace is
not per se unconstitutional, but courts must look to the reasons for use of gas and the amount
used); Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984) (using mace reasonably to calm agi-
tated inmates does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment even when the inmate is con-
fined in his cell). But see Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 770 (4th Cir. 1996) (remanding to
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to insure that prison officials "take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates. '266 Several courts, though, have decided
that sexual abuse by prison guards, which may be the basis for a tort
action, may not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" until the
episodes are considered "severe or repetitive. '267
2. The Subjective Prong
Inmates may successfully allege the second prong requiring deliber-
ate indifference by pointing to the official's failure to follow prison
guidelines268 or to circumstantial evidence regarding the prison condi-
tions.269 For example, to ascertain a prison official's state of mind in
failure-to-protect cases, courts look at the frequency of violence
among inmates, whether constant threats of violence are present, and
whether there is evidence that inmates live in fear of assaults from
other inmates.270 Courts may also consider repeated requests by an
inmate to be moved from his cell.271 However, past instances of vio-
lence, occurring generally or in isolated instances, do not establish
that officers were aware of a risk to a specific inmate. 272 However,
one can prove a failure-to-protect claim "when the official is present
at the time of an assault and fails to intervene or otherwise act to end
the assault, '273 unless the failure to respond was due to a threat to the
the lower court to examine a prison official's use of mace when inmate threw water through his
cell bars).
266. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation omitted).
267. See Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that four incidents
where a prison official made verbal and physical passes occurring within two and one-half weeks
were not cumulatively extreme); Holton v. Moore, 1997 WL 642530, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that two incidents of a prison official touching an inmate's anus and penis during the
course of a search were not sufficiently serious to state an Eighth Amendment violation). But
see Giron v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1255 (D.C.N.M. 1998) (stating that
rape by a prison guard satisfied the "sufficiently serious" first prong of the Eighth Amendment
analysis) (citing Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 1998)).
268. See Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998) (establishing the liability of prison
officials when they knew prison goals were to provide five hours of exercise per week).
269. See infra notes 270-271 and accompanying text.
270. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1534-38 (11th Cir. 1993); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d
559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1268 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Fisher v.
Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1527-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The presence and frequency of these fac-
tors can be gathered through lay testimony and/or statistics. Madrid, supra, at 1268.
271. See Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 642 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that the test for deliber-
ate indifference was met when a prison official spoke to the inmate approximately four to seven
times about problems with the inmate's cellmate, including numerous altercations between the
two cellmates).
272. Giron, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1256-57. See also Andrews v. Siegel, 929 F.2d 1326, 1330 (8th
Cit. 1991) (holding that a pervasive risk of harm may not ordinarily be shown by pointing to a
single or isolated incidents).
273. Williams v. Mueller, 13 F.3d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 1994).
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official's or another's safety.274 Similar to failure-to-protect cases, a
substantial risk cannot be established in claims of inadequate medical
care by pointing to isolated incidents. 275 Furthermore, inadvertent
failure or negligence in diagnosis or treatment does not rise to the
level of deliberate indifference. 276 However, "a physician may be de-
liberately indifferent if he or she consciously chooses 'an easier and
less efficacious' treatment plan. '277
The subjective standard increases to an almost unascertainable de-
gree in excessive use of force cases.278 When inmates claim excessive
use of force by prison officials, the inmate must prove that the prison
official had "maliciously and sadistically" applied the force.279 The
Court places a higher standard on claims of excessive use of force in
order to counterbalance the institutional concerns for the safety of
prison staff and other inmates.280 As a result, prison officials can usu-
ally "hide" behind the rationale of protecting prison safety
concerns.28'
B. Farmer Applied to Physical Conditions of Solitary Confinement
1. The Objective Prong
As demonstrated by Farmer v. Brennan, inmates face a difficult bur-
den in establishing both prongs of the Eighth Amendment test. The
274. Williams v. Willits, 853 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding no Eighth Amendment
violation where the prison guard believed that an attempt to break up a fight between two in-
mates would place himself and others in danger).
275. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1257; Fisher, 692 F. Supp. at 1560. See Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d
48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[W]hile a single instance of medical care denied or delayed, viewed in
isolation, may appear to be the product of mere negligence, repeated examples of such treat-
ment bespeak a deliberate indifference by prison authorities.").
276. See Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc.
Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1989).
277. Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698 (2d Cir. 1998) (suggesting that a doctor choosing an
unnecessary course of treatment based on monetary incentives would demonstrate a culpable
state of mind).
278. See Taryn S. Gordon, Williams v. Benjamin and Violence Against Prisoners by Their Jail-
ers: What are the Limits of Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1410, 1411 (1997)
(discussing the large measure of discretion prison officials have in responding to inmate
disturbances).
279. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. "In this setting, a deliberate indifference
standard does not adequately capture the importance of such competing obligations, or convey
the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pres-
sure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance." Whitley v. Alvers, 475 U.S. 312,
320 (1986).
281. See Luise, supra note 56, at 303. But see Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756 (4th Cir.
1996) (rejecting the state's argument that prison safety justifies atypical punishment and
restraint).
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courts, however, have set general guidelines for assessing conditions
that may constitute a "sufficiently serious" injury. The first guideline
requires courts to look to more than just empirical evidence of the
seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that such injury is
caused by solitary confinement conditions. 282 The court must look
more generally to "evolving standards of decency. ' 283 For instance,
the "deprivation of a single, identifiable human need, '284 such as the
denial of outdoor exercise, 2 5 meets this objective element. However,
courts have limited the application of this standard. For instance, a
prison official may deny outdoor exercise to an inmate in solitary con-
finement if the inmate can engage in some form of exercise in his
cell.286 Another court further limited the standard necessary for
clothing by allowing prison officials to place inmates in solitary con-
finement either naked or with only their underwear. 287
Even though the first prong, alleging a "sufficiently serious" injury,
requires an objective test,288 the courts have routinely found that par-
ticular conditions of solitary confinement do not reach this level of
injury. Some conditions that have been constitutionally upheld in-
clude seemingly insignificant claims to the average observer, such as
the general concept of solitary confinement, 289 limited exercise peri-
ods,290 restricted access to the telephone,291 limited shower opportuni-
282. Cf. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (refusing to rely solely on scientific and
statistical evidence of the dangers of tobacco smoke).
283. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
284. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
285. See Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that the denial of
outdoor exercise violates the Eight Amendment where prisoners lived in isolated segregation for
over a year); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199-200 (9th Cir. 1979) (suggesting that the denial
of outdoor exercise violates the Eighth Amendment where prisoners lived in continuous isolated
segregation, 24 hours a day, in their cell).
286. See Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 1997).
287. See Porth v. Farmer, 934 F.2d 154, 155 (8th Cir. 1991).
288. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Cases decided before Farmer applied a
similar objective test for a sufficiently serious injury and may be addressed herein.
289. See Leslie v. Doyle, 125 F.3d 1132, 1134-35 (7th Cir. 1997) (determining that 15 days in
disciplinary segregation was not sufficiently serious to rise to an Eighth Amendment violation,
even if the inmate had not committed the charged offense); Torres v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 695 N.E.2d 200, 204 (Mass. 1998) (holding that uncomfortable conditions of disciplinary
confinement in a 7'x12' isolated cell do not pose a substantial risk of serious harm when five
hours of outdoor exercise are permitted per week).
290. See Wolff v. Deeds, No. 91-16641, 1993 WL 188365, at *2 (9th Cir. June 2, 1993) (restrict-
ing exercise to one hour a day indoors for security reasons does not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment); Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1980) (denying exercise for short
periods of time based on security concerns does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Douglas v.
DeBruyn, 936 F. Supp. 572, 578 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (recognizing no constitutional right to a specific
form of recreation).
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ties,292 and double ceiling.293 The courts, though, have also upheld
more disturbing conditions. The Ninth Circuit upheld conditions that
lacked vocational and educational programs and that fostered idle-
ness.294 The Supreme Court, in Rhodes v. Chapman, held that over-
crowding, in combination with the absence of work and educational
opportunities does not impose cruel and unusual punishment.295 Fur-
thermore, other courts have determined that the presence of unsani-
tary conditions, such as raw sewage, in an inmate's cell was not so
inhumane as to be declared unconstitutional. 296 One court held that
deprivations of toilet paper, towels, sheets, blankets, mattresses,
toothpaste, toothbrushes and similar items for several days did not
rise to level of a constitutional violation.297 Therefore, the standard
forbidding the deprivation of a single and identifiable basic human
need appears to conform to today's "standards of decency," but in
application, the standard is often too low to challenge.
Before Justice Scalia in Wilson v. Seiter narrowed the use of the
"totality of conditions" approach, 298 many courts considered question-
able conditions in view of other conditions or in view of the overall
condition of the prison.299 For instance, inadequate lighting in in-
mates' cells, combined with other substandard conditions, such as ex-
291. See Douglas, 936 F. Supp. at 578 (determining that greater access to a telephone is not a
basic human need).
292. See Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1988) (depriving inmates of
cultural amenities, such as showering, is not cruel and unusual punishment).
293. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-48 (1981) (holding that double celling in and
of itself is not unconstitutional); Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir. 1984) (same);
Wolff, 1993 WL 188365, at *1 (determining that double ceiling inmates due to overcrowded jail
conditions alone does not establish a basis for an Eighth Amendment violation).
294. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1982).
295. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348, 352.
296. See McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248, 1249 (5th Cir. 1990) (forcing an inmate to spend
23 hours a day in cell where human waste leaked through broken pipes was rationally related to
security measures of prison); Roy v. Jenkins, No. 86-C5738, 1991 WL 202587, at *1, 3 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 3, 1991) (placing an inmate in poorly ventilated cell with raw sewage and human excrement
on the floor and mattress is not unconstitutional).
297. Gilland v. Owens, 718 F. Supp. 665, 685 (W.D. Tenn. 1989). The court held, however,
that "frequent or long term deprivations of such items would deprive inmates of consitutional
rights." Id.
298. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991).
299. See Ray, 682 F.2d at 1247 (citation omitted) ("[T]he court must consider the effect of
each condition in the context of the prison environment, especially when the ill effects of particu-
lar conditions are exacerbated by other related conditions."). Courts are more inclined to find
violations of the Eighth Amendment when several substandard conditions exist rather than
when one offensive condition exists. See id. Conversely, many courts may balance constitution-
ally questionable conditions with factors that raise the quality of the prison environment to de-
termine that the overall conditions are not condemned as cruel and unusual punishment. See
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1971) (balancing conditions of isolation from
human contact with the inmate's diet, availability of hygiene products, opportunity for exercise,
GAP IN PROTECTION
cessive noise, fell below the minimum standards of decency for
conditions-of-confinement. 3°° Double ceiling, in conjunction with
other cell conditions that fostered violence, tension, and psychiatric
problems, created a substantially serious risk to an inmate.301 Unsani-
tary conditions-of-confinement, such as plumbing in disrepair, vermin
infestation, lack of adequate ventilation, and inadequate cell cleaning
supplies, considered in light of "the overall squalor at the peniten-
tiary," undermined the health of inmates and violated the minimum
requirements of the Eighth Amendment. 30 2
However, the Supreme Court in deciding Wilson, now requires the
denial of "a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or
exercise" when applying a "totality of conditions" test.30 3 For exam-
ple, conditions that provide a combination of inadequate food and
medical care deny inmates "the minimal civilized measure of life's ne-
cessities. '' 3°4 Furthermore, limited exercise periods combined with
other conditions, such as confinement in handcuffs and leg shackles,
may create a serious enough deprivation to constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment.30 5 However, the new requirement leaves courts and
prison systems uncertain as to whether the pre-Wilson conditions just
mentioned remain unconstitutional. 30 6
2. Difficulty of Subjective Prong as Applied to Physical Conditions
With the adoption of a subjective standard for "deliberate indif-
ference," the Court in Farmer v. Brennan significantly limited the
number of unconstitutional prison conditions to only those that are
recognized and ignored by prison officials. 30 7 After the inmate suc-
cessfully demonstrates a "sufficiently serious" injury incurred in an
"inhumane condition of confinement," the inmate must then show
participation in therapy, availability of reading materials, and possibility of communication with
other inmates).
300. See Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he lighting was so poor
that it was inadequate for reading and caused eyestrain and fatigue and hindered attempts to
insure that basic sanitation was maintained.").
301. Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing the particular
case from Rhodes, where the facility in Rhodes was described as a "top-flight, first-class
facility").
302. Spellman, 753 F.2d at 783-84.
303. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
304. Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994)) (finding prison officials' failure to assist paraplegic inmates with food trays and
bowel movements constituted inadequate treatment).
305. See Martinez v. Faiman, No. 93C 6225, 1995 WL 383072, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
306. Presumably, these conditions would be upheld as constitutional now, considering that the
inmates did not allege a deprivation of food, warmth, exercise, or medical needs.
307. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38.
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that the prison official intentionally disregarded the substantial risk to
the inmate's safety.30 8 Therefore, inmates have the difficult task of
exposing the prison official's state of mind.
Basically, each case is decided on a case-by-case basis, but several
courts have stated general principles by which to evaluate this second
prong of the Farmer test. Similar to the standard applied in medical
indifference, failure-to-protect, and excessive use of force cases, courts
permit subjective knowledge to be proved by evidence of surrounding
circumstances.30 9 Furthermore, in Gilland v. Owens,310 the court rec-
ognized that the subjective standard does require a showing of bad
faith or malicious conduct.311 The court suggested that plaintiffs can
meet the subjective standard by pointing to "[s]ystemic deficiencies in
facilities, procedures or staffing. ' 31 2 Another court instructed that a
prison official can be found deliberately indifferent only if the official
possessed knowledge of an "infirm" condition and the means to cure
that condition and then consciously and culpably refused to prevent
the perceived harm.313
C. The Farmer Standard Applied to Psychological Effects of
Solitary Confinement
Although courts have been relatively lenient on prison officials in
cases regarding the physical aspects of solitary confinement condi-
tions,314 the courts have provided some safeguards from the physically
"inhumane conditions of confinement. '31 5 The psychological realm of
solitary confinement, on the other hand, has been left wide open to
abuse.316 Inmates have been left unprotected in an area that may
cause longer lasting harm to the inmate and to society than the effects
of impermissible physical conditions-of-confinement. 317 Despite the
potentially dangerous psychological effects of solitary confinement, in-
mates face a particularly difficult time alleging a "sufficiently serious"
psychological injury as well as demonstrating that a prison official was
308. Id.
309. See Simmons, 154 F.3d at 807-08 (finding that evidence such as paraplegia, wheelchairs,
and uneaten trays, provided sufficient and obvious circumstantial evidence to indicate that
prison officials knew a risk existed).
310. 718 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Tenn. 1989).
311. See id. at 687.
312. Id. (citing Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977)).
313. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1993).
314. See supra notes 289-297 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 299-305 and accompanying text.
316. See Luise, supra note 56, at 315; Walton, supra note 259, at 276.
317. See supra notes 299-305 and accompanying text.
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aware of and disregarded a substantial risk for that psychological
injury.318
1. Difficulty in Meeting the Objective Test
Courts, generally, have feared entering into an evaluation of the
psychological effects resulting from solitary confinement. 319 As a re-
sult, fewer standards have been established to create limits to inhu-
mane psychological conditions of solitary confinement. Courts
require the deprivation of a single and identifiable basic human need
to state an Eighth Amendment violation.320 However, many courts
have not recognized mental health as a basic human need. For exam-
ple, in Bono v. Saxbe,321 the court upheld conditions of solitary con-
finement that led to "inactivity, lack of companionship, and a low
level of intellectual stimulation" because the inmate had not con-
tended deprivation of "a basic human need. '322 Some courts hold that
psychological complaints do not state an Eighth Amendment claim.
323
Other courts have justified the presence of psychological effects of sol-
itary confinement as conditions innate to prison life.324 The court in
Jackson v. Meachum 325 recognized that "[c]onditions such as depres-
sion, hopelessness, and frustration may be inevitable consequences of
solitary confinement. ' 326 Furthermore, not every deficiency or inade-
quacy rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. 327 The court
in Davenport v. DeRobertis 328 conceded that a high probability of psy-
318. See Romano, supra note 50, at 1106; Jason Sanabria, Farmer v. Brennan: Do Prisoners
Have Any Rights Left Under the Eighth Amendment, 16 WHrrfTIER L. REV. 1113, 1145 (1995)
(suggesting that courts are hesitant to consider psychological implications of solitary
confinement).
319. See Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1387 (D. Del. 1974) ("While aware that
more subtle forms of punishment, psychological in nature, may also offend the Eighth Amend-
ment's guarantee of civilized treatment, the courts have generally been more tolerant of the non-
physical deprivations associated with solitary confinement.").
320. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
321. 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980).
322. Id. at 613-14 (holding that psychological harm is not dispositive). Such factors as inade-
quate medical care, bedding or heating, or inadequate nutritional value of the food "are fre-
quently crucial to a finding of cruel and unusual punishment." Id.
323. See Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977) (considering psychological or
psychiatric consequences of confinement requires inquiries into "unchartered bog"); Everson v.
Nelson, 941 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that duress, psychological stress, and
retrogression of human development do not state an Eighth Amendment claim).
324. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1262 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[T]he very nature of prison
confinement may have a deleterious impact on the mental state of prisoners, for reasons that are
self evident.").
325. 699 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1983).
326. Id. at 584.
327. See Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1260.
328. 844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1988).
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chological damage occurs during imprisonment. 329 The court in Tous-
saint v. McCarthy330 ruled that "psychological pain" that results from
the boredom of solitary confinement is not cruel and unusual
punishment.331
In these cases, the courts consider the psychological pain exper-
ienced by inmates as a portion of the inmates' punishment.332 Other
courts require a physical injury to accompany the psychological claim
or an extreme and officially sanctioned psychological harm to exist to
allege a "sufficiently serious" injury.333 Therefore, experiences of ter-
ror, psychological harm, and deterioration, which develop in solitary
confinement, alone, fail to raise an Eighth Amendment violation.334
A few courts have recognized the "sufficiently serious" injuries that
may result from psychological aspects of solitary confinement. 335 For
instance, several courts in the Ninth Circuit have recognized and de-
clared unconstitutional the psychological harm that results from living
in a cell with constant illumination. 336 Furthermore, in Ruiz v. John-
son,
3 3 7 the court noted that pain and suffering caused by extreme
levels of psychological deprivation can support a claim of cruel and
unusual punishment. 338 Dr. Haney testified in this case and found a
systemic pattern of extreme social isolation and reduced environmen-
tal stimulation. He observed "frenzied and frantic state[s] of human
despair and desperation," 339 as well as "total deprivation of human
329. Id. at 1313.
330. 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986).
331. Id. at 1108.
332. See supra notes 321-331 and accompanying text. But see Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1263
(recognizing that "a condition or other prison measure that has little or no penological value
may offend constitutional values upon a lower showing of injury or harm").
333. See Doe v. Welborn, 110 F.3d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the fear of assault,
unaccompanied by physical injury does not reflect the deprivation of "the minimal civilized
measures of life's necessities" (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981))); Babcock v.
White, 102 F.3d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1996) (claiming that "it is the reasonably preventable assault
itself, rather than any fear of assault, that gives rise to a compensable claim under the Eighth
Amendment").
334. Cf. Welborn, 110 F.3d at 524-25 (holding that the effects of protective custody do not
violate the Eight Amendment). Protective custody conditions resemble solitary confinement
conditions implemented for disciplinary segregation.
335. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 545-47 (citing cases from the 1960s to 1970s that
recognized the psychological effects of isolation).
336. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1996); Hoptowit v. Mason, 682 F.2d
1237, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The deprivation of nearly all fresh air and light, particularly when
coupled with [lack of control over artificial illumination], creates an extreme hazard to the physi-
cal and mental well-being of the prisoner in violation of the Eighth Amendment."); Perri v.
Coughlin, 1999 WL 395374, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1999).
337. 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
338. Id. at 914.
339. Id. at 913.
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contact, mental stimulus, personal property and human dignity. '340
The court went as far as to analogize the cruel and unusual nature of
psychological deprivations to that of lashing an inmate's back:
As the pain and suffering caused by a cat-o'-nine-tails lashing an
inmate's back are cruel and unusual punishment by today's stan-
dards of humanity and decency, the pain and suffering caused by
extreme levels of psychological deprivation are equally, if not more,
cruel and unusual. The wounds and resulting scars, while less tangi-
ble, are no less painful and permanent when they are inflicted on
the human psyche.341
More particularly, the court in Madrid v. Gomez recognized that "if
the particular conditions of segregation ... are such that they inflict a
serious mental illness, greatly exacerbate mental illness, or deprive in-
mates of their sanity, then [prison officials] have deprived inmates of a
basic necessity of human existence ...[and] have crossed into the
realm of psychological torture. '342 However, just as the court giveth,
the court taketh away. The court in Madrid acknowledged the psy-
chological torture present in conditions of solitary confinement but
limited the class of persons who may be protected from them. 343 The
court protected inmates who were already mentally ill and those in-
mates at an unreasonably high risk of suffering a serious mental illness
as a result of the conditions in the SHU. 344 However, according to the
court, inmates not characterized as having serious mental disorders
were not deprived of a basic necessity of life.345
As seen, courts across the country have had numerous reactions to
the psychological conditions imposed on inmates in solitary confine-
ment. As a result, no particular standard has been adopted to guide
courts in their analysis of psychological effects of solitary confinement.
2. Difficulty in Meeting the Subjective Portion of the Test for
Psychological Conditions-of-Confinement
In order for a prison official to be held accountable for a "suffi-
ciently serious" psychological injury, the prison official must have
been deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health or safety. 346 Con-
sequently, if a prison official is not aware of a substantial risk to the
340. Id.
341. Id. at 914.
342. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
343. See id. at 1267 ("[W]hile the conditions in [Pelican Bay's solitary confinement] may press
the outer bounds of what most humans can psychologically tolerate, the record does not satisfac-
torily demonstrate that there is a sufficiently high risk to all inmates.").
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
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inmate, the official cannot be held accountable. For example, a prison
official's failure to recognize "readily apparent" scars inside an in-
mate's wrists, elbows, and neck as signs of attempted suicide amounts
only to negligence.347 Even in a case where an inmate expressed to
prison officials his thoughts of suicide, the court found that the prison
officials had not acted with deliberate indifference. 348 Deliberate in-
difference requires that the inmate "had communicated a 'strong like-
lihood, rather than a mere possibility, that self-inflicted harm w[ould]
occur' and 'that custodial official knew or should have known of that
strong likelihood.' ' 349 Essentially, the subjective standard requires
physical evidence and officer recognition of a psychological harm or
injury.
The court in Madrid found that the subjective element was met only
in cases where the inmates had pre-existing mental disorders.350 To
the extent that prison officials were aware of certain inmates with seri-
ous mental disorders and of conditions of social isolation that posed a
significant risk to the mental health of inmates, the officials acted with
deliberate indifference by failing to take action to protect those in-
mates.351 The court imputed to the officials the knowledge that condi-
tions-of-confinement in social isolation are harmful.352
Courts have struggled with the application of this subjective stan-
dard in psychological conditions-of-confinement cases. 353 The Sev-
enth Circuit has even chosen to apply a more stringent deliberate
indifference standard in cases where an inmate alleges a psychological
risk, requiring a malicious and sadistic intent on behalf of the prison
official.354 In Babcock v. White, an inmate alleged that prison officials
had violated the Eighth Amendment by keeping him in the facility
347. Cf. Freedman v. City of Allentown, 853 F.2d 1111, 1116 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that mere
negligence does not support a civil rights claim requiring deliberate indifference).
348. See Johnson v. Hill, 910 F. Supp. 218, 221 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
349. Id. (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991)).
350. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1266-67.
351. See id.
352. See id.
353. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 552-54.
354. Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 270-73 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring a malicious and sadistic
act by officials with respect to the prisoner's fear of physical harm to rise to a sufficiently culpa-
ble state of mind); Bullock v. Barham, 23 F. Supp. 2d 883, 884 (N.D.Ill. 1998) (stating that the
Eighth Amendment is violated if a prisoner is incarcerated under conditions posing an objective
risk of serious harm in conjunction with deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials).
In such cases, however, the inmate carries a lighter burden in establishing the objective portion
of the test because a malicious and sadistic intent always violates contemporary standards of
decency. See Babcock, 102 F.3d at 273 (citing Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)).
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despite his fear of physical harm from other inmates.355 Prison offi-
cials placed the inmate in administrative detention with members of a
gang that had threatened to kill him, even after Babcock had been
classified as a "separation" 356 case. The court found that the prison
officials did not act maliciously or sadistically because no actual as-
sault ever occurred. 357
V. WAYS TO FILL THE GAP IN PROTECTION FROM PHYSICAL TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS
The cases discussed in the previous section illustrate a broad gap in
protection from cruel and unusual punishment between the physical
and psychological conditions-of-confinement.3 58 Courts are more re-
luctant to find constitutional violations in the psychological conditions
of solitary confinement rather than in the physical conditions.359 The
physical conditions are visible and more readily apparent to prison
officials. Therefore, prison officials' subjective awareness of physical
conditions can be measured on a uniform basis.
Psychological conditions, on the other hand, are usually hidden in
the minds of the inmates.or incapable of diagnosis by lay observers,
such as prison guards. Courts have a difficult time measuring the psy-
chological conditions and the subjective standard of guard awareness
because courts have recognized fewer universal standards of decency
in this area. 360 Therefore, because prison officials do not have psycho-
logical expertise, they are held to a lower standard in recognizing
these conditions.361 Prisons have psychologists and psychiatrists on
staff that are qualified to recognize harmful symptoms. But, facilities
either lack a sufficient number of mental health staff362 or the staff
concentrate their services only on those inmates previously deter-
mined to be mentally ill.363 Other mental health staff dismiss particu-
355. See Babcock, 102 F.3d at 269. Babcock was not a failure-to-protect case because Bab-
cock's complaint alleged a failure to prevent exposure to the risk of harm and not failure to
prevent harm. Id. at 272.
356. Separation cases involve "'[ijnmates who may not be confined in the same facility with
other specified individuals."' Id. at 268 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 524.72(g) (1992)).
357. Id. at 273.
358. Compare supra notes 282-306 and accompanying text, with supra notes 314-345 and ac-
companying text.
359. Compare supra 282-306 and accompanying text, with supra notes 314-345 and accompa-
nying text.
360. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 542. "There is no fixed standard for determining
how much harm the prisoner must suffer before this first prong is satisfied." Id.
361. See id. at 539.
362. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 75-82.
363. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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lar symptoms as feigned or manipulated conduct; therefore, staff
members fail to refer the troubled inmate to a psychiatrist. 364
Prison officials must recognize and ignore particular deprivations of
basic human needs in isolation, rather than conditions as a whole, in
order to be held deliberately indifferent. 365 Because of the difficulty
in assessing psychological harm, courts should look at conditions as a
whole, rather than requiring a deprivation of one of a limited number
of basic human needs. As seen above, several conditions in combina-
tion work together to cause the psychological harm.366 Therefore,
these conditions should be assessed together. Furthermore, courts
should use sociological studies to define standards of decency when
evaluating psychological conditions-of-confinement. As seen in Part
II, psychologists have recently attempted to define particular "mini-
mal civilized measures" of prisoners' mental health needs through
studies conducted in isolation cells. 367
A. The Nature of Psychological Conditions Cases Require Courts to
Look at the "Totality of Conditions" Approach
The court in Madrid restrained from protecting all inmates because
of the limits of legal precedents.368 However, the court did recognize
the seriousness of the potential injury and the prison officials' knowl-
edge of the harmful conditions.369 The cases discussed in Part IV,
however, avoided addressing psychological injuries by either under-
mining the actual effects of confinement as less than sufficiently seri-
ous or by disregarding the sufficiently serious injuries as hidden from
the prison officials' awareness. 370 The courts undermine the psycho-
logical effects of solitary confinement in all of these cases by aban-
doning the "totality of conditions" approach. This approach allows
the courts to look at prison conditions as a whole without requiring
364. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 77-78. Even some psychiatrists view the
behavior as fake psychotic symptoms "to make an excuse of mental illness. Id. at 79. A behav-
ioral clinician at the Maximum Closed Facility in Indiana expressed his view that "most cases of
self-mutilation reflected no more than an inmates desire to be transferred out of the MCT." Id.
at 78. This behavior can be considered manipulative; however, the clinician failed to realize that
the behavior can also be a symptom of a major psychiatric disorder. Id. Further observations by
a trained psychiatrist could have discerned between the two possibilities.
365. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1990).
366. See supra notes 96-136 and accompanying text.
367. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 542. See also supra notes 96-136 and accompany-
ing text.
368. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 557.
369. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
370. See supra notes 257-357.
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the deprivation of a single and identifiable basic human need.371 The
"totality of conditions" approach allows the courts to look at all of the
conditions at Tamms, and other questionable institutions, including all
aspects of sensory deprivation, the lack of meaningful educational and
vocational opportunities, and the loss of numerous privileges, together
under one analysis.372 Although none of these conditions alone may
be particularly inhumane or cause excessive harm, the combination of
the three creates the psychological effects witnessed by Drs. Grassian
and Haney. 373
The psychological studies evaluated the conditions-of-confinement
taken as a whole 374 and identified the harmful effects that surface as a
result of the combination of all conditions, not just one single and
identifiable condition.375 These studies suggest that all of the condi-
tions at supermax facilities similar to Tamms have a mutually enforc-
ing effect.376 Looking at each condition separately ignores the true
nature of supermax prisons like Tamms. The Department of Correc-
tions designed Tamms with all conditions strategically selected to con-
trol the behavior of the inmates.377 Therefore, the courts should
approach the conditions at Tamms by examining the effects of the en-
tire system.378
B. Reliance on Psychological Studies May Bridge the Gap
In addition to looking at conditions of solitary confinement as a
whole, courts should rely on sociological studies in determining evolv-
ing standards of decency. The Eighth Amendment protects inmates
from cruel and unusual punishment determined by "evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. ' '379
Throughout the century, the United States has matured into a society
371. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (finding conditions in isolation cells, as a
whole, violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
372. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
373. See supra notes 96-136 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 96-136 and accompanying text. In these studies, the researchers consid-
ered the physical aspects of the cell, the amount of permissible exercise, the amount of meaning-
ful activity, the lack of human contact, and among other things, the loss of privileges. See supra
notes 96-136 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 96-136 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 96-136 and accompanying text.
377. Pete Rosenbery, Word is Out, S. ILLINOISAN, Nov. 18, 1997, at Al.
378. This approach has been adopted by international courts, commissions, and committees.
Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 476 (1989). See also Nan D. Miller, Com-
ment, International Protection of the Rights of Prisoners: Is Solitary Confinement in the United
States a Violation of International Standards?, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 139, 165 (1995). See Haney
& Lynch, supra note 52, at 551.
379. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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that relies on social science to institute reform.380 Courts increasingly
rely on psychological data in numerous areas of the law.381 However,
courts generally do not rely on psychological data when assessing the
psychological conditions-of-confinement. 382 To bridge the gap be-
tween physical and psychological conditions-of-confinement, courts
need to rely on social science studies to develop standards for both
prongs of the Eighth Amendment test, including use in determining
"evolving standards of decency." Psychological studies should also
provide notice to prison officials of the existence of sufficiently serious
psychological conditions in their prison environments.
1. The History of the Court's Use of Social Sciences in Judicial
Determinations
Throughout history, judges have adhered to a "common sense"
view in their judicial determinations where they have relied more on
their own intuition than on the scientific theories of their day.383 Fear
of scientific theories may have been justified in earlier centuries when
psychology "suffered from an absence of facts" and "consisted of little
more than social ideology. ' 384 However, in light of twentieth century
advances and the increased accuracy of scientific studies, courts have
begun to adapt to the time and consider psychological data and
theories.385
The Court first recognized the benefits of social sciences in the early
1900s. 386 In 1908, Justice Louis Brandeis introduced social science
data in support of his brief for the petitioner in Muller v. Oregon.387
The Brandeis brief utilized social science data to argue that long hours
380. See generally PAUL ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972) (discuss-
ing the need for a reliance on social science to understand the role of law in a rapidly changing
democratic society).
381. See Craig Haney, Social Factfinding and Legal Decision-making: Using Psychology to
Change Law, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 43, 46 (Dave J. Muller et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter
Haney, Social Factfinding].
382. See IRWIN A. HOROWITZ & THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW: INTE-
GRATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 352-53 (1983) (discussing the Court's failure to rely on psychologi-
cal studies in Rhodes v. Chapman); Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 543. But see Madrid v.
Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1227-30 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing psychological studies of inmates to
determine the importance of solitary confinement).
383. See Haney, Social Factfinding, supra note 381, at 48.
384. Id. at 45.
385. See HOROWITZ & WILLGING, supra note 382, at 345.
386. See Haney, Social Factfinding, supra note 381, at 48. Haney suggests, though, that the
Court had been relying on social facts before its initial acknowledgment with the Brandeis brief.
Id.
387. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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of work are detrimental to women's health.38 The Court in Muller
received the document into evidence, taking notice "of all matters of
general knowledge. '38 9 The emergence of the Court's recognized use
of social science data coincided with the period's transition in legal
thinking from legal formalism to legal realism.390 During the early
1900s, psychological scientists, such as Sigmund Freud, John Watson,
and Hugo von Munsterberg, suggested that psychology had practical
applications in law.391 Prominent figures in the judicial system, includ-
ing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice Louis Brandies, and Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, shared in the support for the incorporation of so-
cial sciences in law.392 The transition to legal realism became most
readily apparent during the Depression in the 1930s.393 As the realists
advocated the awareness of social context as opposed to sole reliance
on precedent, the courts became increasingly receptive to the use of
social science data in judicial decision-making.3 94 In essence, the
courts were adapting to the "evolving" theories and practices of their
time to resolve existing social issues.
In the 1950s, the Court expanded its use of social science data in
Brown v. Board of Education.395 In this decision, the Court placed
strong reliance on social science data reflecting the damaging effects
of racial desegregation. 396 The Court's reliance on the social sciences
in this case particularly demonstrates the process in which courts
388. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 105 n.61 (1993) (tracing the roots of the
Court's use of social science data) (citing Louis BRANDEIS & JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, WOMEN
IN INDUSTRY 22-32 (Leon Stein & Philip Taft eds., 1969)). Louis Brandeis later became a
Supreme Court Justice and often utilized the sociology and economics of the early 1900s in legal
arguments about changes in labor laws. See IRWIN A. HOROwrrz ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
LAW: INTEGRATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 6 (2d ed. 1998).
389. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
390. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 388, at 100-05.
391. See HORowrrz ET AL., supra note 388, at 6-7.
392. See id.
393. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 388, at 108. Social and political changes during the
Depression sensitized the Court to issues of social equality. Id.
394. Id. at 104.
395. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
396. See id. at 495 n.ll. Footnote 11 has become famous for its citation to seven different
social science references. However, written opinions of the Supreme Court Justices reveal "ig-
nored, misused, distorted and misinterpreted psychological literature" to justify decisions at odds
with empirical data. See J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The
Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 145 (1990) (discussing the Court's mistreatment
of psychological studies on jury behavior in its trial law cases). However, today's society would
agree that regardless of the "flimsiness" of the data, the Court correctly decided that the sepa-
rate-but-equal doctrine was inherently unequal.
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adapt to "evolving standards" in judicial decision-making.397 Brown
effectively overruled Plessy v. Ferguson,398 the earlier "separate-but-
equal" decision on racial segregation. 399 Although unacknowledged,
the Court in Plessy relied on assertions of social fact in determining
the legitimacy of segregation. 4°° In justifying the "separate-but-equal"
doctrine, the Court premised its argument on the prevailing Darwinist
theories against government intervention in social relations.401 As the
years progressed, so too did society's theories on segregation.40 2 So-
cial science studies during this period determined that segregation
generated a feeling of inferiority among the children as to their status
in the community that may affect them in years to come. 40 3 The Court
recognized that the Plessy Court did not have the psychological
knowledge to realize these effects, but that the emergence of this
knowledge mandated the Court to grant the plaintiffs equal protection
of the laws because "separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."4°4
Similarly, in regards to the issue of solitary confinement, courts up-
held the use of solitary confinement in the absence of psychological
data suggesting its harmful effects. As discussed above, studies re-
flecting the devastating impact of social isolation in solitary confine-
ment did not become prevalent until the 1980s with Drs. Grassian and
Haney's work.405 Now that these reports have become more preva-
lent and acceptable, courts are beginning to reconsider their earlier
stances on the issue of solitary confinement. For instance, the United
States District Court of the Northern District of California utilized
social science data and literature in analyzing the inmates' psychologi-
cal claims resulting from confinement at Pelican Bay.40 6 The court
acknowledged that:
[slocial science and clinical literature have consistently reported
when human beings are subjected to social isolation and reduced
environmental stimulation, they may deteriorate mentally and in
397. "Evolving standards of decency" applies to Eighth Amendment characterization of cruel
and unusual punishment. Other areas of law, such as Equal Protection, rely on "evolving stan-
dards" as well, as seen in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
398. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
399. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 (concluding that the doctrine of separate but equal had no
place in education).
400. See Haney, Social Factfinding, supra note 381, at 47-48 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 531).
401. See id.
402. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 n.1l.
403. See id. at 494.
404. Id. at 495.
405. See supra notes 96-136 and accompanying text.
406. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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some cases develop psychiatric disturbances. . . . [S]ome people
may sustain long-term effects .... [T]he Court finds that many, if
not most, inmates in the SHU experience some degree of psycho-
logical trauma in reaction to their extreme social isolation . ... 407
The Madrid court used psychological testimony to call for modifica-
tions in certain practices, such as in the administration of mental
health care services. 40 8 However, the trial court stopped short of pro-
tecting the majority of prisoners from psychological suffering and
long-term harm because the Court appeared restrained from address-
ing the "totality of conditions" by current legal doctrine.40 9 Because
the conditions in isolation "[did] not have a uniform effect on all in-
mates, ' 410 the court held that "for many inmates, it does not appear
that the degree of mental injury suffered significantly exceeds the
kinds of generalized psychological pain that courts have found com-
patible with Eighth Amendment standards. '41' The court was not
persuaded that the risk of developing mental injuries was of a suffi-
ciently serious magnitude to find that the conditions at Pelican Bay
violated the Eighth Amendment.41 2
2. The Use of Sociological Data to Define Sufficiently Serious
Injuries
Tamms presents circumstances similar to those seen at Pelican Bay,
therefore, a legal analysis similar to that employed in Madrid v.
Gomez can be applied to Tamms. However, this Comment has just
set out a large amount of background information to provide a frame-
work for what appears to be a just solution to the constitutionally
questionable implementation of solitary confinement at supermax fa-
cilities, such as Tamms, as applied to all inmates.
Courts use the two-prong test refined in Farmer v. Brennan to ana-
lyze psychological conditions-of-confinement claims under the
breadth of the Eighth Amendment.413 In order to demonstrate cruel
and unusual punishment, a Tamms' inmate must show that a suffi-
ciently serious injury or risk to mental health exists and that prison
officials acted with deliberate indifference in recognizing and resolv-
407. Id. at 1230, 1235.
408. See id. at 1210.
409. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 554-55.
410. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1235.
411. Id. at 1265.
412. See id. "[Tihe record does not satisfactorily demonstrate that there is a sufficiently high
risk to all inmates of incurring a serious mental illness from exposure to conditions in the SHU
to find that the conditions constitute a per se deprivation of a basic necessity of life." Id. at 1267.
413. See supra notes 318-357 and accompanying text.
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ing those injuries or risks. 414 To prevent mental injury before it oc-
curs, an inmate can allege that the psychological conditions-of-
confinement pose substantial risks to mental health.415 Helling re-
quires the inmate to show that the conditions at Tamms are "sure,"
"very likely," or "imminently" likely to cause "serious" damage to the
inmate's future health.416 However, the plaintiff does not need to
prove that every inmate at Tamms would be injured from the health
risk;417 for it is the "threat that makes the punishment obnoxious" and
a violation of the Eighth Amendment.41 8 The inmate must then show
that society considers the exposure to the risk a violation of contem-
porary standards of decency. 419 The courts need to rely on social sci-
ence to define this standard similar to the manner in which the Court
in Brown v. Board of Education relied on these types of studies to
determine "contemporary standards of decency" in relation to racial
segregation.
The courts, according to Helling, can rely on science and statistics
but must also consider whether today's society would tolerate these
psychological risks.420 The first part of the societal view analysis can
be met by relying on the studies performed by Drs. Grassian and Ha-
ney. Legal doctrine allows courts to look to studies similar to the con-
ditions at Tamms; and the uncovered conditions closely resemble the
conditions at Tamms.42l The psychological effects reflected in the
Tamms complaint and letters closely mirror the psychological effects
witnessed by Drs. Grassian and Haney. 422 Therefore, the conclusions
drawn by Drs. Grassian and Haney from their observations at Wal-
pole and Pelican Bay could substantially support theories of psycho-
logical trauma at Tamms. Each study revealed that inmates suffer
devastating mental injury from conditions of social isolation.423 Drs.
Grassian and Haney do not suggest that every inmate subjected to
414. See supra notes 241-244 and accompanying text.
415. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1993).
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).
419. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.
420. See id. See also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981) ("In determining
whether a challenged condition violates 'evolving standards of decency,' courts may consider
opinions of experts and pertinent organizations.").
421. Compare supra notes 11-45 and accompanying text, with supra notes 96-99, 117-123 and
accompanying text.
422. Compare supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text, with supra notes 100-116, 124-136
and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 96-136 and accompanying text.
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these conditions will actually suffer mental illness; but Helling stated
that such a burden need not be shown.4
24
The second part of the societal analysis requires courts to determine
the subjective beliefs of society with respect to social isolation. Cur-
rently, though, the majority of society has little or no opinion regard-
ing the conditions at Tamms, considering that the prison just opened
its doors less than two years ago. Assuming that society was aware of
most of the psychological studies concerning solitary confinement,
their reaction would most probably be one of awe and disapproval.
Many inmates, psychologists, and commentators have suggested that
inmates leave solitary confinement with a concern for the safety of
themselves and others upon their release back into society.425 If in-
mates and experienced psychologists are concerned, so too should so-
ciety, because their safety is at risk. Imprisonment does not have to
rehabilitate inmates, but hopefully prison conditions will not create
more violent inmates than existed before confinement.
Assuming that most of society is unaware of the psychological stud-
ies and conditions of solitary confinement, Tamms inmates should not
be held to a standard as high as in Helling in ascertaining society's
views. The subject matter concerned in each of the two cases have
completely different exposure levels in the media. Society is re-
minded daily about the harmful effects of cigarette smoking through
newspapers, billboards, commercials, lawsuits, and even the labels on
the cigarettes themselves. Solitary confinement does not receive near
the amount of media attention as does cigarette smoking.426 Constant
media attention increases the public's exposure and awareness to the
harmful effects of cigarettes, which allows the public to form opinions
424. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 33.
425. See Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 6; Inmate Letters, supra note 11; see
also Israel L. Barak-Glantz, Who's in the "Hole"?, 8 CRIM. JUST. REV. 29 (1983) (finding that
prisoners in punitive isolation were more likely to be repeat offenders than a control
population).
426. Numerous articles regarding Tamms have appeared in local papers, but most of them
describe only the prison goals, the types of prisoners admitted, and the physical conditions-of-
imprisonment, without ever addressing the possibilities of psychological trauma. See Hard Times
Getting Harder, supra note 29, at 1; New Prison No Country Club, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998,
at 51; Parsons, Locked Out, supra note 15; Michael Pearson, New Jail's Residents: Worst of the
Worst Tamms Prison is 'Someplace You Don't Want to Go,' PEORIA J. STAR, Mar. 9, 1998, at B1;
Rosenbery, supra note 377, at 4A; Terry Wilson, Designed to Isolate Bad Apples Superprison
Awaits I" Inmates, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 1998, at N2. Most of these articles were written before the
psychological effects of placement at Tamms became visible. See id. However, the psychological
evidence of mental torture at similar prisons would have been available.
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regarding this matter.42 7 The public is less likely to form an opinion
on a topic with which they are unfamiliar, such as the topic of solitary
confinement; if they do form an opinion, the opinion may be based on
one-sided information. Society's views were much more informed in
the Helling case than society's views will ever be on the topic of soli-
tary confinement. Courts must also be careful when looking to soci-
ety's views on a topic that is usually presented from one perspective.
An analogy can be drawn to the media's portrayal of criminal justice.
The media forms society's perception of crime by presenting only the
sensational side of crime, such as a gruesome murder scene or a guilty
verdict. 42 8 This portrayal by the media presents one-sided informa-
tion that society absorbs as the entire story.429 In a study conducted
by The Center for Media and Public Affairs, researchers found that
"even though the homicide rate in the United States dropped by 20
percent from 1993 through 1996, major network news coverage of
murders increased on an average of 721 percent within the same time
period. ' 430 As a result, society has a skewed perception on the
amount of violence in our society and the reaction that should be
taken by our government. 431 Similarly, the Illinois Department of
Corrections has portrayed one-sidedly the conditions of solitary con-
finement at Tamms.432 Therefore, the courts should not look to an
uninformed society but instead should rely on psychologists who have
the resources and expertise to be informed of the true nature of soli-
tary confinement.
However, if courts feel the need to rely on some form of public
view, the court should consider a number of news articles and psycho-
logical analogies in support of the view that those that are informed in
society find solitary confinement a violation of "contemporary stan-
dards of decency." Individuals and groups have spoken out against
427. Cf. Jimmy R. Moye, Comment, The Confluence of Sensationalism and News: Media Ac-
cess to Criminal Investigations and the Public's Right to Know, 6 COMM. L. CONSPEcrus 89, 89
(1998).
428. See id.
429. Id. at 89-90. As a result, society tends to view all criminals with disgust. Andrew E.
Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1039,
1052 (1998). This practice by the media creates further devastating effects by fueling efforts to
impose harsher punishment to reduce the falsely perceived increase and severity of crime. See
Jason Dzubow, Fear-Free Public Housing?: An Evaluation of HUD's "One Strike and You're
Out" Housing Policy, 6 TEMP. POL. Civ. R-rs. L. REv. 55, 55 (1997).
430. Moye, supra note 427, at 89 (citing Howard Kurtz, The Crime Spree on Network News:
While Homicides Fell, Murder Coverage Swelled, A Survey Finds. Is It All O.J. 's Fault?, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 12, 1997, at D1).
431. See Keith R. Reitz & Alice Donnelly Madden, Essay, The Reactions of Criminal Justice
Professionals to a Law Review Symposium, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 1217, 1223 (1998).
432. See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 49:567
GAP IN PROTECTION
the cruel nature of Tamms in news articles and political activist com-
mittees. 433 Some members of society have spoken out against the na-
ture of supermax prisons in other areas of the country as well.434
Furthermore, in the absence of public knowledge or opinion, courts
should allow the inmate to analogize society's perception of the con-
tested issue to related issues. 435 The effects of social isolation in soli-
tary confinement has been analogized to the mental injuries sustained
by prisoners-of-war. 436 The majority of society believes that the
mental torture suffered by prisoners-of-war surpasses humanitarian
standards of decency.437 If the effects of exposure to mental torture
are analogous to the effects of social isolation in solitary confinement,
then the public perception of those effects should be analogous as
well. Some may argue that a flaw exists in this argument considering
that POWs are portrayed as heroes while inmates are seen as filth.
However, the argument regarding the media's portrayal of crime, dis-
cussed above, 438 also applies in this context. While the media portrays
inmates as evil human beings unworthy of substantive rights, the me-
dia glorifies POWs as heroes. As a result of these characterizations,
society empathizes with the POWs' sufferings but cannot extend the
same kind of empathy necessary for understanding the mental torture
suffered by inmates.439
433. See Lisa Anderson, Is 'Supermax' Too Much? Strict Isolation of Inmates Called Cruel,
Ineffective, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1998, at Cl; Editorial, Cruel and Unusual, ST. Louis POsT-DIs-
PATCH, Jan. 6, 1999, at B6; Eig, supra note 15, at 64; Gauen, supra note 23, at Cl; Patrick Gauen,
Lawsuit Will Challenge Conditions at Tamms Prison: Mentally Ill Inmates are Plaintiffs, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 7, 1999, at B1 [hereinafter Gauen, Lawsuit]; Andrew Herrmann,
Editorial, A Solitary Fate Worse than Death, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at 23; Emily B.
Hertz, Commentary, A Criminal Solution to Crime, CHI. TlUB., Apr. 11, 1998, at N16; The
Tamms Experiment: Treatment or Torture?, MICH. CHRON., Apr. 28, 1998, at 6A; The Tamms
'Experiment': Treatment or Torture?, Illinois Opens 'Supermax' Control Unit Prison in Tamms,
WALKIN' STEEL, Fall 1998, at 1 (a production of the Committee to End the Marion Lockdown).
Furthermore, a political activist committee has been formed to "Shut Down Tamms." This
group includes Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Uruhu Move-
ment, the MacArthur Justice Center, family members of the inmates, and concerned citizens.
434. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 1-2; Miller, supra note 378, at 139; Bruce
Porter, Is Solitary Confinement Driving Charlie Chase Crazy?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1998, § 6, at
52.
435. See Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 914 (1999). The court in Ruiz engaged in a
similar practice when analogizing psychological deprivations to the suffering caused by lashing.
Id.
436. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 64-67; Grassian, Psychiatric Effects, supra
note 48, at 16; Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 508-10; Whittaker, supra note 72, at 273.
437. See Miller, supra note 378, at 169.
438. See supra notes 427-432 and accompanying text.
439. See Taslitz, supra note 429, at 1039. It is hard to imagine that society would tolerate the
United States employing mental torture tactics to enemy POWs. These tactics violate American
and international standards no matter who the victims are. Id. Also, one cannot forget that the
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3. The Use of Sociological Data to Impute Prison Officials'
Knowledge
Psychological pain does not always display physical characteristics.
As discussed above, prison psychiatrists rarely see disturbed inmates;
therefore, the determination is left to the prison guards and staff.440
Psychological effects are often hidden to the average observer, and
hence, to the prison officials.4"' Prison officials are not experienced
psychologists and are not trained to recognize certain psychological
symptoms. 4 42 Furthermore, prison officials cannot envision the long-
term effects of solitary confinement on the inmates.443 As current law
stands, with the exception of Madrid and Ruiz, the subjective compo-
nent of the Farmer test will rarely be met in psychological conditions-
of-confinement cases.444
Psychological studies have shown that the psychological conse-
quences of living in conditions similar to Tamms for long periods of
time are "predictably destructive, and the potential for these psychic
stressors to precipitate various forms of psychopathology is clear-
cut. '445 The Supreme Court relied on sociological data to acknowl-
edge the detriments of long hours of work446 and the damaging effects
of segregation on children's self-identity.447 Similarly, courts have rec-
ognized the harmful effects of cigarette smoke in prisons448 and the
devastating effects of social isolation in prison.449 Therefore, courts
should impute knowledge to prison officials who institute certain meas-
inmates at Tamms may not be the "worst of the worst" in our society's eyes. For instance,
Robert Boyd, one of the inmates at Tamms, was sent to prison for auto theft, but then was sent
to Tamms for assaulting prison staff members. See Eig, supra note 15, at 62. Robert Boyd does
not appear to be the ruthless, unrehabilitative type of inmate that the Department suggests they
house.
440. See supra notes 362-364 and accompanying text.
441. See Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 5. Most people have never exper-
ienced or witnessed another experience hallucinations, paranoia, and confusional psychoses.
Therefore, the common observer would be less likely than an experienced psychologist or psy-
chiatrist to recognize these symptoms when they occur. Id. As a result, the common observer
may tend to characterize abnormal symptoms as volitional acts by the inmate to either instill fear
or feign mental illnesses. Therefore, prison officials may escape liability for Eighth Amendment
violations by claiming either that they were unaware of the effects or that they believed the
inmate was malingering.
442. See id.
443. See id.
444. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 52, at 565-69.
445. Haney, Infamous Punishment, supra note 48, at 6.
446. See supra notes 387-389 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 395-404 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 212-220 and accompanying text.
449. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 913-15 (1999). See supra notes 406-412 and accom-
panying text.
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ures while knowing the harmful effects. 450 This knowledge and prison
officials' failure to alleviate the risks of social isolation should satisfy
the deliberate indifference portion of the Eighth Amendment test.
Evidence suggests that prison officials at Tamms are familiar with
the devastating effects of solitary confinement. Nic Howell, a spokes-
man for the Illinois Deptartment of Corrections commented in a news
article that the Department has been anticipating litigation in regards
to Tamms before they ever opened the doors.451 Presumably, the De-
partment was aware of the Pelican Bay litigation and/or the increase
in psychological research suggesting the inhumanity of conditions sim-
ilar to those implemented at Tamms. The supermax facilities have all
been designed and modeled after one another.452 The Department
must be aware that if Pelican Bay has constitutionally questionable
conditions, then so does Tamms. This type of knowledge and failure
to act constitutes deliberate indifference.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions-of-con-
finement that amount to cruel and unusual punishment if the condi-
tion causes a sufficiently serious injury or risk and prison officials were
aware of the risk and disregarded it. Prison officials are neither psy-
chiatrists nor psychologists; therefore, they cannot look at an inmate
and diagnose the inmate with a particular psychiatric condition. How-
ever, prison officials are aware of the potential consequences that soli-
tary confinement may bring; prison administrators created supermax
facilities with the intention of using some of the psychological conse-
quences as a means of controlling prisoner's behavior. Prison officials
should have some latitude in defining measures for inmate control,
but not when it strips the inmate of their sanity and identity. Accord-
ing to psychological studies, not only are the psychological effects an
Eighth Amendment violation, but also the effects solitary confine-
ment create larger risks for the general prison population and for soci-
ety. Society places a strong reliance on social sciences in making
everyday decisions. The courts must follow and rely on psychological
studies to interpret the "evolving standards of decency" for a society
generally uneducated about the true nature of solitary confinement
conditions in supermax facilities such as Tamms.
Christine Rebman
450. See Romano, supra note 50, at 1132-33.
451. See Gauen, Lawsuit, supra note 433, at B1.
452. See Rosenbery, supra note 377, at Al.
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